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INTRODUCTION 
 
Theories of European integration often aim to explain the development of European 
regional integration or the institutional structure of the EU. There are especially two 
approaches that have been labelled the “grand theories” of European integration. The 
first one of these two is neofunctionalism (Haas 1958, Lindberg 1963). This theory 
stresses how integration in specific policy domains can spill over to others, and how 
these “spillover” processes constantly make the different domains appear more and 
more interconnected. Whereas neofunctionalists believe that the driving forces behind 
the “spillover” processes are non-state actors, Intergovernmentalism (Hoffman 1966), 
the other “grand theory”, argues that the European integration is driven by the actions 
and interests of the member states. This theory is derived from the “realist school” of 
international relations, and is hence advocating that the governments act out of 
geopolitical interests when they make decisions in the European Union. 
 
But since the 1970s neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism have gradually been 
replaced by more “mid-level explanations of cross-systematic political processes” (Hix 
2005:16-15). The new frameworks that have been advocated are liberal-
intergovernmentalism, the rational choice institutionalist perspective and different 
variants of  “supranationalism”.  Liberal-intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1998) 
focus on how the big decisions, the treaties, can explain the integration process. This 
theory is derived from intergovernmentalism, but relaxes some of the assumptions of 
its predecessor. The member states are still the primary actors in the EU political 
system, but their preferences are not fixed and they may be driven from economic 
interests rather that geopolitical interests. The “supranational governance” perspective 
criticises liberal-intergovernmentalists for their reliance on the assumption that the 
member states always are in full control of the integration process. Because of the 
limited information about the long term implications of decision-making, the 
supranational institutions (the Commission, the European Parliament and the European 
Court of Justice) may influence the institutional and political outcomes much more 
than liberal-intergovernmentalists suggest that they do. Pierson (1996) advocates how 
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a variant of “supranationalism” called historical institutionalism (HI) may explain the 
integration process in a more nuanced way by showing how decisions may create path 
dependencies that limit the amount of member state control, and at the same time, 
increase the powers of the EU institutions. Rational choice institutionalists (like 
Tsebelis and Garrett (1996), Scully (1997), Moser (1996, Crombez (1996), 
Steunenberg (1994)) employ formal models of particular bargaining situations when 
trying to determine what kind of policy outcomes that will be the result under certain 
circumstances.  This theoretical branch produces outcomes that may be similar to one 
of the other branches dependent on what kind of formal model it applies when 
theorising. All three perspectives may explain some part of the integration process in 
an adequately manner, but may lack the capabilities to explain every single aspect of 
the EU on their own. Another thing they have in common, is that all three, to some 
extent, underestimate the implications of the day-to-day decision-making.  
 
The small decisions are also an important part of the integration process, even though 
their effects may be a lot harder to detect in the EU history. Even so, this thesis will 
give all its attention to the everyday decision-making of the EU. There are many 
possible approaches to this kind of problem, and this thesis will concentrate on one of 
the key legislative institutions of the EU (liberal-intergovernmentalists will say The 
legislative institution), namely the Council of Ministers (hereafter the Council).  
 
The Council is a complex institution. It shares legislative powers with the European 
Parliament (the EP) and executive powers with the Commission. It is a permanent 
negotiating forum consisting of ministers from the member states. Even though it 
constantly interconnects with the EP and the Commission, the Council members are 
more directly accountable to their national electorates and parliaments than to their 
institutional colleagues (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006:2).  Decision-making in 
the Council is hence not a clear-cut process.  This thesis aims to explore a small, but 
important, part of this complex process by determining the extent of the Council 
members‟ voting behaviour that may be explained by their positions on single issues.   
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Although a lot have been said about decision-making in the Council, there is little 
research regarding whether the Council members in fact make their preferences or 
expressed positions the main guideline for their actual voting behaviour. By combining 
voting results with preference positions that are estimated by policy experts, it is 
possible to explore whether the Council members are voting in line with their own 
positions on single-issues. Hence the research question of this thesis is: 
Can positions on single-issues explain voting behaviour of the Council of 
Ministers? 
 
Approach to the Problem and its Relevance for the Council 
Literature 
This thesis reveals whether there is consistency between the Council members‟ 
positions and the votes that are actually taken by combining two different data sources.  
Quantitative interview data from the “Decision Making in the European Union” 
(DEU)-project (Thomson and Stokman 2003) is compared with data based on the 
Council Minutes. In the DEU data every country has been given a (position) value 
between 0 and 100 on each issue dimension that is attached to the 70 proposals 
considered. The countries‟ positions on each issue as well as reference points (status 
quo) and policy outcomes are estimated by policy experts during interviews. In 
contrast, the latter data is drawn from a larger data set collected by Sara Hagemann 
and is continuously updated.  This data is based on information on all legislation 
adopted in the time period from 1999 to present time (Hagemann 2006, 2007). The 
time overlap between the two data sources is 1999-2002; hence this is also the time 
period of this thesis.  
 
Combining the two data sets has not been done previously in the literature on the 
Council of Ministers. Matching the Council members‟ positions on single-issues with 
voting records, that reveal how they actually voted on each issue, may hence make a 
contribution to the existing Council literature. It may improve our understanding of 
decision-making in the Council in general, and more specifically: our understanding of 
the voting behaviour of each explicit Council member. 
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In order to link the findings related to the research question to the existing literature, 
this thesis also analyses the political space of the Council by using both data sets and 
compares the results of the analyses with each other. By doing this it is possible to say 
something about how the political space of the Council affects voting behaviour in 
general, and also how it may affect the research question of this thesis. 
  
Summary of the Findings  
The main argument of this thesis is that positions on single issues explain only a 
proportion of the actual voting behaviour in the Council of Ministers. By employing a 
simple spatial model the thesis tests whether the Council members vote in line with 
their positions on single-issues or not. The findings reveal that the model manage to 
predict (by using the positions as predictions) a large amount of the actual “yes” votes, 
but performs more poorly when predicting the extent of the actual opposition recorded 
on each proposal. Even so the model manages to detect some of the disagreement 
showed by the Council members at the final stage of decision-making.  
 
The test of the simple spatial model also supports some of the findings from the 
correspondence analyses of the different data constellations and some of the main 
findings in the Council literature. The large member states record their opposition 
more frequently than their smaller counterparts. The model overestimates the extent of 
negative statements that actually are raised by the smaller member states, suggesting 
that there are some costs related to voting “no” for these countries in particular. This 
thesis also shows that the medium-sized countries oppose the actual decision-making 
more frequently than the largest countries (on the overlapping proposals of both data 
sets), and that the southern European  member states are just as likely, or to some 
extent even more likely, to oppose decisions at the final stage of decision-making as 
their northern European counterparts . 
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Plan of the Thesis 
In order to give an adequate picture of the voting behaviour in the Council, both in 
relation to the findings in the existing Council literature and the findings presented in 
this thesis, the thesis is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 presents the recent literature on this field. The findings of previous studies 
will also be further elaborated on in the next chapters in order to place the findings of 
this thesis in a broader empirical setting. Chapter 1 is hence only a general overview of 
some of the main findings in the Council literature, a starting point for further 
elaboration and discussion. 
 
Chapter 2 presents how formal models have been applied in the Council literature. 
Further on, it outlines the simple spatial model that will be applied when determining 
whether the Council members vote according to their own preference or not. After 
this, the chapter examines the data sets and discusses the rest of the research design of 
the thesis in more detail. The main problems linked to the employment of the data sets 
and the choice of research design will also be discussed. 
 
Chapter 3 replicates the study of Zimmer et al (2005) in order to show how choice of 
method may play a role when defining the political space of the Council. This chapter 
is also the fundament for the further analyses of this thesis, as it outlines how the 
political space of the Council may be determined.  
 
Chapter 4 analyses the different data constellations in the same way as Zimmer et al. 
(2005) does. The findings of these analyses structure the test of the simple spatial 
model in Chapter 5, and give the results of this test a further empirical justification. 
 
Chapter 5 evaluates the performance of the simple spatial model, both its aggregative 
performance and how it performs in relation to each Council member‟s voting 
behaviour. The findings in this chapter are also compared to the findings from the 
existing Council literature.  
12 
 
  
Chapter 6 evaluates the assumptions and the predictions that are attached to the simple 
spatial model. It also discusses alternatives to the simple spatial model, and outlines 
how the findings of this thesis could be further explored in the future.  
 
The Conclusion summarises the findings and compares them with the findings from 
the Council literature in general. 
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1 CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The Council is a complex institution. It shares executive functions with the 
Commission and legislative functions with the EP. The Council members are, first and 
foremost, national politicians appointed by their member states, but at the same time 
also ambassadors of the agreements and decisions taken by the EU in their home 
countries. They decide upon a variety of EU topics, some organised by sector other 
more multi-issue in nature. These decisions are taken by informal bargaining as well as 
formal decision-making, making the tension between confidentiality and openness 
evident for all to see (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006:4-6).  
 
The Council meets in different configurations based on the subjects addressed, and 
usually there are the ministers with the relevant specialist responsibilities who meet in 
these configurations (i.e. the Minister of Agriculture meet in the Agriculture and 
Fisheries Council and so forth). Before these meetings there have been extensive 
preparatory phases where the proposals have been discussed at working group level 
and then passed on to COREPER, the committee of the permanent representatives 
from each member state. Most decisions (70%) are hence in practice made before 
reaching the Council level (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006). But the Council still 
has to adopt all legislative decisions. Even though many of the proposals go relatively 
smoothly through the system, it is important to detect the level of opposition attached 
to some of the not so clear-cut proposals. Studies in the Council literature hence focus 
on these main questions: how the Council vote, who votes with whom, which policy 
domains are the most contested ones  and what kind of underlying dimensions may be 
important in the decision-making process. This chapter will now outline the main 
findings in these studies. 
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1.2 Decision-making in the Council: Patterns of Conflict1 
Before examining the studies in further detail, it could be useful to refer to some of the 
rules and norms that govern voting behaviour in the Council. First and foremost, the 
Council does not vote in a formal sense of stating positions or raising hands, voting is 
more implicit than explicit. Actual and explicit voting takes place only when some 
countries contest the proposals during the negotiations. Usually it is the chairperson 
that keeps track of the different member states‟ positions and voting is hence of a more 
informal character when countries are not opposing the proposal (Mattila 2004:30). 
When the chairperson knows that there is unanimity in the Council, a proposal can be 
adopted with a single sentence from the chairperson. But if there is any contestation, 
those member states that are opposing or abstaining can choose to record this 
officially. The contestation levels vary form policy area to policy area; agriculture and 
fisheries and issues related to the internal market are the most contested ones (Mattila 
and Lane 2001:39). 
 
When the unanimity rule is applied, abstentions are not counted as “no” votes. Hence 
decisions can be made with only few countries actually voting for a proposal, if none 
of the countries openly contest it (Mattila and Lane 2001:39). But the opposite is true 
for qualified majority voting (QMV). In EU 15 (the EU primarily considered in this 
thesis) QMV means that 62 out of 87 votes are needed for the adoption of a proposal 
to be successful. The number of votes attached to each country is estimated on the 
basis of each country‟s population size and the threshold for majorities. The voting 
weights of EU 15 subscribed 10 votes to Germany, France, UK and Italy, 8 votes to 
Spain, 5 votes to Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece and Portugal, 4 votes to Sweden 
and Austria, 3 votes to Finland, Denmark and Ireland and 2 votes to Luxembourg 
(Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006:264-265). 
 
Then we may turn the attention to the existing Council literature on this topic. The data 
collected by Mattila and Lane shows that during the period from 1994-1998 the 
Council had a preference for finding a solution that is acceptable for all member states, 
                                                     
1
 Some of the arguments in this section have previously been presented in Wøien Hansen (2008). 
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and that the expansion of memberships (from 12 to 15 states) did not affect voting 
patterns in any significant way. In general, the tendency is for one or two countries to 
oppose the majority and rarely three or four countries. Heisenberg (2005:68) explains 
this tendency as the result of a more than 40-year long history of negotiations among 
the same partners. The new members are immediately introduced to the norms 
governing this “culture of consensus”. Because of the high frequency of meetings and 
negotiations, she stresses that the trust among the partners is very high and that 
reputation matters a lot. Hence negotiations may be more personalised in the Council 
than in other multilateral settings (Heisenberg 2005:68). Table 1.1 illustrates how the 
“culture of consensus” was evident at the final stage of decision-making during the 
years 1994-1998: 
 
Table 1-1 Voting in the Council 1994-1998: The preference for consensus 
 
Year No. of legislative 
acts 
% of “no” votes Abstentions (%)2 Unanimous 
decisions (%) 
1994 261 14 11 75 
1995 344 18 4 78 
1996 340 12 2 86 
1997 218 17 6 78 
1998 218 19 6 75 
Source: General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union/ table taken from Mattila and Lane (2001:40) 
 
Table 1.1 shows that, with the exception of 1996, the total level of opposition (“no” 
votes and abstentions) was relatively stable during this five year-period. Even though 
the data reveals a dominant preference for making decisions by consensus, different 
studies indicate that there are some clearly identifiable institutional and political 
factors behind governments‟ decisions to agree or disagree with the majority of the 
Council. Those factors may or may not challenge the widely supported “consensual 
bias” in the future.  
 
                                                     
2
 The percentage of abstentions means the proportion of abstentions in which one or more countries abstained 
from voting but no ”no” votes occurred (Mattila and Lane 2001:40). 
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Mattila (2004:46) advocates that leftist governments tend to vote less against the 
majority than the right-wing governments, and by this finds support for an evolving 
left-right dimension in Council voting. But, contrary, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 
(2006:290) find no evidence of traditional left/right cleavages in the patterns of 
(explicit) voting. Related to this, Mattila (2004:46) advocates that if a government 
strongly favours increased integration, its position on the left-right dimension does not 
matter much. In fact, all other things being equal, pro-integration governments are the 
least likely to vote against the majority (hence favouring all possible outcomes of 
integration compared to no integration, status quo) (Mattila 2004:46). The left-right 
dimension is also supported by Hagemann and Høyland (2008). They advocate that 
coalition formation in the Council falls along some ideological left-right dimension, 
and that the Council members, to some extent, act as if party political lines affect their 
decisions. A further implication of this is that changes in government composition also 
mean a change in that country‟s behaviour at the EU level, exemplified by preferring 
other coalition partners than the ones favoured by their predecessor.   
 
Another frequently supported finding in the literature is that the large countries are 
more likely to oppose decisions than their smaller counterparts. Heisenberg (2005) 
shows that the five large member states (EU 15) account for 46 % of the votes against 
and 54 % of the abstentions, and that the smaller member states hardly ever vote “no” 
or abstain from decisions. This suggest that “size matters” for the likelihood to oppose 
decision-making at the final stage. Mattila (2004) also finds data support for a “large 
versus small countries” dimension in addition to a left-right dimension and an 
independence-pro-integration dimension.  He believes that the reasons behind this 
evident dimension are more related to issues of political culture and national pride than 
the idea that large countries are overrun by the small countries in the negotiations 
(Mattila 2004:43 and 46). Mattila and Lane (2001) also find support for this “large 
versus small”-countries dimension,  but Hagemann (2007) shows that following the 
enlargement (EU 25) the country-group that is voicing their opposition the most 
frequently is in fact a group of medium-sized members rather than the largest countries 
of the EU. 
17 
 
 
 
 
But the patterns of voting and coalition-partners do not stop here. Mattila (2004) finds 
also some support for a redistributive dimension. Governments from member states 
that benefit financially from the EU are less likely to vote against proposals than 
member states that are net contributors to the EU budget. Zimmer et al (2005:403) 
advocate the same tendency, but their findings (data is here taken from the “Decision-
Making in the European Union” project) differ to some extent from Mattila‟s findings 
(data based on the Council Minutes). They do not find any major support for a left-
right conflict or an ideological cleavage, their analysis rather shows that the 
redistributive dimension decisively shapes the interactions of the Council. The conflict 
between net-distributors and net-receivers manifest it self because poorer member 
states (from the south and the east) for the most part prefer extensive regulation of the 
market with low production costs whereas the northern member states tend to advocate 
greater competition (Zimmer et  al 2005:417). 
 
The so called redistributive dimension has several similarities with a north-south 
dimension, a dimension that is widely supported ( Mattila 2006, Mattila and Lane 
2001, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006). Mattila (2006) advocates, that the northern 
countries are more likely to share preferences of a more general kind with each other, 
than with the southern states (and vice versa).  In relation to this Zimmer et al 
(2005:403) suggest that the north-south dimension rest upon various sub-divisions, the 
most important which being the redistributive dimension. The analysis conducted by 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006:290) support this latter notion. But even so the 
general north-south dimension is still advocated, and Mattila (2006) shows that the 
enlargement has not affected the conflict between the north and the south. The new 
members did in fact position themselves along this dimension in a similar way like the 
older members
3
. 
 
Hagemann (2007:13) disagrees with Mattila (and to some extent Hayes-Renshaw and 
Wallace and Zimmer et al) and finds no signs that the frequency with which a country 
                                                     
3
 The literature also considers how an “old versus new members” bloc may influence the political space of the 
Council. But since this thesis only analyses EU 15 and both Heisenberg (2005) and Hagemann (2007) show that 
such “blocs” are not likely to affect the decision-making, this dimension is not treated explicitly in this chapter. 
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opposes the majority is prescribed by its geographical location. In relation to this 
Heisenberg  (2005:77) shows that even though large countries were more likely to vote 
“no” than their smaller counterparts during the years 1994-2002, it is not the case that 
rich or poor countries vote against or abstain more often than their counterparts, or that 
net-payers are more likely to dissent than net-receivers.   
 
Hagemann also shows that the level of disagreement, which is recorded officially in 
voting, has not increased significantly since the enlargement (EU 25). But interestingly 
she finds that opposition is increasingly voiced in formal statements rather than via 
voting. “These statements are used to signal to home governments that the 
representative has stressed his or her position on a piece of legislation, but was 
reluctant to take a more drastic step and prevent consensus” (Hagemann 2007:1), and 
are included in the voting records in the minutes or posted at the Council website 
following the adoption of the proposal. Table 1.2 illustrates the increased tendency to 
voice opposition in formal statements: 
 
Table 1-2 Oppositions, Abstentions and Formal Statements per Year:  
Increasing level of formal statements  
(*The period “January to April 2004” had an increased amount of legislation passed in order to prepare for 
enlargement) 
 Jan-Dec 
1999 
Jan-Dec 
2000 
Jan-Dec 
2001 
Jan-Dec 
2002 
Jan-Dec 
2003 
Jan-
April 
2004* 
May-
Dec 
2004 
Jan-Dec 
2005 
Jan-Dec 
2006 
All 
legislation 
161 169 160 164 163 139 86 121 211 
Disagreement 
voiced 
through 
voting 
24,2% 20,1% 32,5% 17,7% 22,1% 7.9% 10,5% 10,7% 29,4% 
Disagreement 
voiced either 
through 
voting or 
formal 
statements 
32,9% 34,9% 48,8% 32,3% 42,3% 33,1% 22,1% 43% 46% 
Source: Hagemann (2007:8). 
 
Including formal statements, both in analyses of the political space of the Council and 
in analyses of the voting behaviour of the Council members, may hence give a more 
detailed picture regarding the actual levels of contestation. 
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1.3 Summary of the Council Literature 
Table 1.3 summarises the main findings in the Council literature: 
 
Table 1-3 The Political Space detected by the Council Literature 
 
Author Type of data Main findings: conflict structure Method 
Mattila and 
Lane 
(2001) 
Council Minutes 
1381 pieces of 
legislation from 1994-
1998 
Large countries are significantly more inclined to 
vote “no” than their smaller counterparts. Finds 
support for the north-south dimension. 
Search for unanimity, consensus building.  
Roll-call analysis 
Multidimensional 
scaling 
Mattila 
(2004) 
Council Minutes 
180 observations from 
1995-2000: voting 
records for 15 member 
states for 12 half years 
periods 
Results support that the political space is defined 
by two dimensions: left-right and independence 
versus integration dimension. Pro-integration and 
left-wing governments as well as smaller countries 
vote “no” less frequently than their counterparts. 
Roll-call analysis 
Bivariate and 
regression 
Zimmer, 
Schneider, 
Dobbins 
(2005) 
Expert interviews 
DEU data- Thomson et 
al.70 Commission 
proposals: 162 issues 
on decrees, directives 
and decisions under 
Consultation and Co-
decision 
Results support that a redistribution dimension 
shapes the political space. The north-south 
dimension is a sub-dimension of the redistribution-
dimension as goes along the line of the conflict 
between the net-distributors (north) and the net-
receivers (south and east). 
Correspondence 
analysis 
Heisenberg 
(2005) 
Council Minutes 
Recorded legislation 
from 1994-2002 
Size do matter, the five largest countries account 
for 46 % of the votes against. Finds no support for 
the redistributive dimension. Informal norm of 
consensus prevails. 
Roll-call  
analysis 
Hayes-
Renshaw 
and 
Wallace 
(2006) 
Council Minutes 
Recorded legislation 
1994-2004 
No evidence of traditional left/right cleavages. The 
north-south dimension as a redistribution 
dimension. 
Expert interview, 
document analysis 
Mattila 
(2006) 
Council Minutes 
805 legislative acts 
from May 2004 to April 
2006 
Clear existence of a north-south dimension even 
after enlargement. This can be interpreted as free 
market based solutions versus regulatory solutions. 
Slightly increased consensus. 
Roll-call analysis 
NOMINATE 
Hagemann 
(2006 and 
2007) 
Council Minutes and 57 
expert interviews 
January 1999 to 
December 2006 period. 
872 pieces of 
legislation. 
After the enlargement the medium-sized members 
are the ones that vote “no“ most frequently, rather 
than the largest members. Still some conflict 
structure of geographical location, but no distinct 
pattern. Governments act strategically rather than 
sincerely when deciding how to best pursue their 
policy preferences. 
Roll-call analysis 
NOMINATE: 
(geometrical 
scaling method) 
Hagemann 
and 
Høyland 
(2008)  
Council Minutes 
January 1999 to 
December 2006 period. 
872 pieces of 
legislation. 
Ideological affiliations influence coalition 
formation in the Council. Coalition patterns 
change when governments are replaced.  
Ideal point 
estimation 
technique 
 
These findings will be compared with the findings presented throughout in this thesis. 
When summarising the findings, the conclusion will present the main findings of the 
thesis in the same table format as table 1.3 in order to link the findings directly to the 
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Council literature. But before presenting the findings in the literature and the findings 
of the thesis in more detail, it is necessary to examine the research design and to 
present the data sets that are applied throughout the remaining chapters. The next 
chapter will hence outline the research design and the methodological challenges that 
are attached to it. 
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2 CHAPTER 2: THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
2.1 The Research Design: Model, Method and Data 
In order to answer the research question, this thesis will employ a simple spatial model 
that illustrates how the Council members should vote if they vote in accordance to 
their positions revealed by the data set collected by the DEU-project. The combination 
of both position data and actual voting data makes a close to ideal environment for 
testing the predictions of a simple spatial model. A strict test of a model, such as the 
one presented in this chapter, will reveal whether the member states in fact vote 
sincerely or not. Are the member states voting in line with their preferences (which the 
DEU data set reveals)?  This question will be analysed thoroughly in chapter 5 and 6, 
but before this it is necessary to present and explain the research design in more detail.  
 
In order to embed the research question in a broader empirical setting and reach more 
nuanced conclusions in relation to the voting behaviour of the Council members, this 
thesis will also employ other quantitative techniques
4
. This chapter is hence structured 
as follows: The first section presents a very general overview of how formal models 
are applied in the Council literature and then ends by presenting the logic behind the 
spatial model that is employed in this thesis. The second section presents the two data 
sets, examines the other quantitative techniques that this thesis relies upon and 
explains how the two data sets have been treated before the analyses. It ends by 
outlining the main two methodological challenges attached to this thesis, and shows 
briefly what has been done in order to accommodate those problems. 
 
2.2 The Simple Spatial Model5 
The rational choice institutionalist perspective, which was mentioned in the 
introduction to this thesis, has been advocated by a lot of scholars in the Council 
literature.  The different contributions based on game theory have usually tried to 
                                                     
4
 The statistical program, R, is used for all analyses presented in chapter 3 and 4. 
5
 Some of the arguments in this section have previously been presented in Wøien Hansen (2007). 
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establish the benefits of being agenda setters and veto players in relation to the 
different legislative procedures used in the EU, and also what would be the most likely 
decision outcome under the different procedures.  Because of differences in modelling 
the scholars present different answers to these two main topics of discussion. Tsebelis 
and Garrett (2000) model the final stage of the decision-making process as a one-
dimensional formal model where every actor has stable and Euclidean preferences
6
  
around a given, ideal point as well as complete information about each other. The 
Commission and the EP are modelled as unitary actors favouring more integration than 
the Council, whereas the Council is modelled as seven different players. The reason 
for this latter modelling is that QMV voting requires roughly 5/7 (62 out of 87) votes 
in order for a decision to be successful. By employing such a model Tsebelis and 
Garrett (2000:23) predict a different outcome under the co-decision I procedure than 
the one they predict would happen under the consultation procedure:  
 
 
 
Figure 2-1 The Standard Version of Tsebelis and Garrett 
(As presented in Rittberger (2000)) 
 
 
The basic features of the model: The 15 Council members are modelled as seven 
actors in a one-dimensional space where SQ at the left of the dimension is the existing 
policy and the Commission and the EP are modelled as unitary actors at the right side 
of the less- or more integration dimension. The preference of actor 3 is the outcome 
                                                     
6
 Euclidean one-dimension preferences are separable and utility declines monotonically in distance from the 
ideal point (Milyo 2000). Euclidean preferences are also categorised as a particular type of cardinally single-
peaked preferences (Bogomolnaia and Laslier 2007). 
 
 
SQ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 EP,C 
Less integration More integration 
 
Outcome  
under 
codec I 
Outcome  
under  
consult. 
                                                                       
SQ= status quo                     
C= Commission’s ideal position                                                                                                  
EP= EP’s ideal position                                                                                                   
1-7= Council’s positions 
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under the Co-decision I procedure, whereas the preference of actor 4 is the outcome 
under the Consultation procedure. 
 
The main argument made by this model is that under the Consultation procedure the 
EP could in fact present the Council with a proposal that was easier for the Council to 
adopt than to reject, whereas under Co-decision I the Council could give the EP a take-
it-or-leave-it proposal if the negotiations in the Conciliation committee collapsed. 
Hence the introduction of the Co-decision I-procedure (by the Maastricht Treaty) was, 
according to Tsebelis and Garrett, a loss for the EP (i.e. outcomes would be closer to 
status quo compared to outcomes under the Consultation procedure). This because the 
Co-decision I procedure introduced a third round of decision-making. If the Council 
and the EP could not agree in the second round, the two parties could meet in a 
conciliation committee in order to reach agreement. If no agreement could be reached, 
the Council could present the EP with any version of their common position that they 
would like to present, and since the EP favours more integration over no integration 
(status quo) their veto right is built upon an, in fact, empty threat than would not be 
used in practice (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000:22-23).   
 
Other scholars (like Scully 1997, Moser 1996, Crombez 1996, Steunenberg 1994 and 
Rittberger 2000) criticise many aspects of this model by suggesting that it does not 
take into account some important factors and aspects of decision-making in the EU. 
Scully (1997:65-66) advocates that the outcomes that Tsebelis and Garrett predict 
under the different procedures are fundamentally wrong based on four main criteria: 1) 
they do not take into account how the previous rounds of decision-making influence 
the final round, 2)The conditional agenda setter rights of the EP under the consultation 
procedure may only come into effect if the EP gains the support of the Commission, 3) 
Unconditional veto rights (as granted by the Co-decision procedure(s)) make sure that 
the EP never can be worse of than status quo and 4) Proposals are just as (or even 
more) likely to be adopted in the previous rounds of decision-making. Hence 
modelling the decision process of the EU in an adequately way is not an easy task. But 
the strength of this thesis is that it already has the preferences and actual votes of the 
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Council members, making it possible to test whether they vote in line with the 
assumptions of a simple spatial model or not. The DEU data set also has estimates for 
the decision outcomes as well as estimates for the status quo in relation to each 
proposal. This makes it possible to test a spatial model that shares many of its 
assumptions with the standard version. 
 
The logic behind the model employed in this thesis is very simple, and may be 
presented in a similar manner as the standard version of Tsebelis and Garrett: 
 
Figure 2-2 A Simple Spatial Model 
 
According to this model “country Y” would vote yes regarding this proposal since the 
decision outcome is closer to Y‟s ideal position than status quo (the outcome if the 
Council cannot reach any agreement) is to Y‟s ideal position. But if Y positions itself 
at point 2, Y will be indifferent between the status quo and the decision outcome, and 
hence also vote yes because of the underlying assumptions of game theory. When 
taking an indifferent position the Council members would prefer a deal over no deal at 
all, whereas if Y prefer point 1 it should absolutely oppose this proposal if it acts upon 
its own interests. The member states would hence vote against the proposal if status 
quo is closer to their ideal position than the decision outcome. This simple spatial 
model does not give any room for random utility; hence the testing of it will be strict 
in manner. By this it is meant that, when matching positions with votes nothing else 
than the exact recorded position is considered. Chapter 5 shows how the testing of the 
 
 
SQ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 EP,C 
Less integration More integration 
SQ= status quo 
C= Commission’s ideal position 
EP= EP’s ideal position 
1-7= Council’s positions 
 
Country Y 
Decision 
outcome 
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simple spatial model is done in practice, but for a complete understanding of the 
testing is it important to bear in mind the premises outlined in this section. 
 
2.3 Research Design 
2.3.1 The Data 
The two data sets employed in this thesis differ from each other in many ways, so this 
section presents the main characteristics of both data sources. 
 
The data set “Decision making in the European Union” (DEU) has a three year time 
frame, 1999-2002, and was developed by an international team of researchers.  It 
consists of estimates of EU decision makers‟ most favoured positions on controversial 
issues and also the levels of salience they attached to these issues. The DEU data set 
has information on 174 issues from 70 Commission proposals, and the proposals were 
chosen to obtain a number of issues from a range of policy areas (Thomson and 
Stokman 2003:6-10). The Commission proposals were subject to either the 
Consultation- or the Co-decision procedure and the proposals were introduced during 
or before December 2000, and were on the agenda in 1999 and/or 2000 (Thomson and 
Stokman 2003:14).  Of the 70 proposals, 42 were subjected to the Consultation 
procedure, while 28 were governed by the Co-decision procedure
7
 where the EP and 
the Council are (more) coequal legislators. 
 
The data was conducted through interviews held with 125 experts, most of them who 
belonged to the national delegations of the Council in Brussels. The experts specified 
the issues at stake in relation to every proposal. The positions of the 15 member states, 
the Commission and the European Parliament were estimated along a standardised 
policy scale with values from 0 till 100 in which the distances between the actors 
reflect the political distance between them. The reference point (the state of current 
                                                     
7
 16 of  28 proposals subjected to the Co-decision procedure was treated after the reform of this decision 
procedure, meaning they were actually subjected to the Co-decision II procedure where the conciliation 
committee is the final round (Thomson et al. 2006:317) 
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affairs) and the decision outcome attached to each issue were also defined along this 
continuum (Thomson and Stokman 2003:21).  
 
The drawbacks of interview data are well known, and Thomson and Stokman 
(2003:15) stress that they are well aware of the limitations of expert judgements. Even 
so, they advocate that their research design minimises these problems:   
 
”First of all, we focus on specific issues raised during the discussions on legislative proposals, 
rather than more abstract policy dimensions, such as a socio-economic Left-Right dimension. 
The meaning of these specific issues is clear, while more abstract policy dimensions may 
mean different things to different people. Second, we held in depth interviews with a 
relatively small number of experts, rather than a survey of a large number of individuals. 
Consequently, we were able to monitor the effort devoted to answering the questions, and the 
expertise on which the experts drew when providing their estimations”  
(Thomson and Stokman 2003:15). 
 
But they also point out that the experts usually had first hand knowledge of the 
decision situations and were participants (i.e. members from the permanent 
representations of the member states or civil servants representing their state in 
Council discussions) in the decision-making processes. Thomson and Stokman 
(2003:15) justify this by emphasising the need for detailed information, even though 
this means that the policy experts interviewed could not be considered to be truly 
neutral and impartial experts.  
 
The other data set, hereafter called the voting data set, is collected by Sara Hagemann, 
and consists of all legislative acts from January 1999 until today, but this thesis only 
uses data from the time period 1999-2002, which is the overlapping time period 
between the two data sets. During this time period 654 legislative acts were decided 
upon.  The data is collected from the minutes of the Council meetings as documented 
by the Council website, the inter-institutional database PreLex and the Council‟s 
Access Service.  The Council minutes include each country‟s decision to abstain, 
oppose, support and/or if they have made a formal statement.  
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The latter phenomenon may also be posted separately at the Council website, and not 
explicitly in the Council minutes. Information about procedure, date of introduction 
and adoption, A and B points
8
, policy area,  title of proposal, policy contents, which 
stage of the legislative process the vote was taken and which stage the proposal was 
adopted, inter-institutional reference number, sectoral council and the name of  the 
member holding the presidency are also included (Hagemann 2006:81).   
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the formal statements following the adoption of a proposal 
may reveal another level of contestation in the Council. Such statements may be 
recorded to show disagreement with the decision taken, often even regarding decisions 
where disagreement may not have been expressed through formal voting (Hagemann 
2006:37).  The voting data set includes all negative statements; negative votes, 
abstentions and the disagreement voiced through formal statements. The simple spatial 
model will be tested against a wider interpretation of the actual voting behaviour of the 
Council including all contestation that is possible to detect at the final stage of 
decision-making. In this way it is possible to give a more detailed picture of the voting 
behaviour shown by the Council members, and reveal more levels of contestation than 
just the levels accounted for by the negative votes and/or abstentions made.   
 
Hagemann (2006:82) mentions two main limitations to her data. First, only those 
decisions which result in successful adoption are recorded. Hence there are no data on 
the decisions that the Council cannot reach agreement on, or the contestation levels 
attached to these “flawed” decisions. Second, decision-making in the Council could be 
subjected to vote trading, especially between legislation bundles that are on the agenda 
for the same meeting. Vote trading means that deals could be struck between the 
Council members that affects their voting behaviour on individual proposals. In return 
for agreement on one proposal, a Council member may choose to vote for a decision 
                                                     
8
 B-point labelled proposals are supposed to be more controversial than A-points, but Hagemann (2006) shows 
that this not always hold when we look a the level of recorded disagreement attached to these decisions. Hence 
this division will not receive any explicit attention in this thesis. See Appendix A for information on which 
proposals that were labelled A-points and which (five proposals) that were labelled B-points. 
28 
 
  
whose content this member was initially against. These limitations would be further 
elaborated on in chapter 6. 
 
2.3.2 Methods and their Drawbacks 
In addition to the simple spatial model this thesis also employs other quantitative 
techniques. The motivation for this is to define the political space of the Council, and 
let these findings structure the test of the simple spatial model as well as 
complementing the test findings by providing a useful background. To show how the 
political space may be revealed, this thesis will replicate the study of Zimmer et al. 
(2005) and then do the same type of analysis with the other data constellations 
presented here. Since the analysis of Zimmer et al. also is based on the DEU data set it 
is natural to compare the findings of this thesis with their findings, and it is also 
interesting to extend their research design by applying it at the voting data as well. 
 
In order to determine the political space of the Council, we first have to determine how 
many dimensions that are likely to affect the decision-making in general. 
A factor analysis or principal component analysis can reveal if the issues related to the 
different proposals, in fact, are versions of some more general issue dimensions. If the 
conflict structure is two-dimensional or three-dimensional it would certainly be easier 
to determine the negotiating positions of the Council members.  
 
Factor analyses are frequently employed in order to reveal the latent conflict structure 
of multiple variables. According to Kim and Mueller (as cited in Zimmer et al 
2005:409), factor analysis (FA) serves to reduce multiple variables to a few 
hypothetical constructs or factors. But Zimmer et al (2003:409) advocate that FA has 
several disadvantages when applied on the DEU data set. For instance, the sample size 
of the DEU data set is a bit too small for a FA, and the data is not measured 
sufficiently in order to meet the requirements of this analytical tool. Since FA is based 
on correlation matrixes and weighted variable sums the data should be measured on an 
interval scale level. The DEU data set could be said to be measured on an interval 
scale level regarding some of the issues considered, but since the different issues have 
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values in accordance to their policy content the interval scale level does not apply to 
all of them. For example if issue X are divided into two position values: 0 (status quo) 
and 100 (new policy) it is not possible to measure the exact distance between these 
two positions.  
  
Other tools for detecting the spatial orderings of the Council are multidimensional 
scaling (MDS) and hierarchical clustering (HC).  HC is a form of cluster analysis, and 
may in this thesis detect different clusters of Council members. This clustering process 
yields a hierarchy where subsets of clusters are aggregated to form the clusters at the 
next aggregated level and so forth.  Hence it is possible to detect likely coalition 
partners and then make a division between likely partners and more likely partners for 
each original cluster. In the end the different stages in the process are presented as a 
tree diagram where the branches indicate when clusters come together or/and are 
separated (Bartholomew et al. 2002:17-18) MDS, on the other hand, aims to reveal the 
structure of  a data set by plotting points in one or two dimensions. The result of a 
MDS analysis is a picture that can be interpreted as a map (Mattila and Lane 2001:44). 
Hence distance is the prime concept in MDS, meaning that this technique may 
determine the (political) distance between one Council member and another making 
the ones close to each other likely coalition partners (Bartholomew et al. 2002:53-54).  
Both techniques could easily define the dimensional space of the Council, but it would 
be difficult to trace the positions back to the influence of the issues that are contested 
(Zimmer et al 2005:409). But the problems of MDS, HC and FA could be avoided by 
employing alternative techniques; principal component analysis (PC) or 
correspondence analysis (CA). 
 
The differences between these two techniques are quite small. PC is a descriptive 
method that is concerned with summarising a data matrix in a manner which expresses 
its structure in a small number of dimensions (Bartholomew et al 2002: 143). The aim 
of CA is the same: to represent the raw data in a low-dimensional space so that it is 
easier to identify the key features of the data (Bartholomew et al 2002:81). The main 
difference between the two analytical techniques lies in the criteria each of them 
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employ in order to explain whether the model fits or not. In CA the dimensions are 
derived in order of importance in the meaning that the first dimension explains the 
largest proportion of Pearson‟s chi-squared statistic (or inertia), while in PC the 
components are also determined in order of importance but also in terms of the 
proportion of variance explained (Bartholomew et al 2002:116).  Both CA and MDS 
convert a small table of numbers into a plot of points in a smaller number of 
dimensions – most usually two dimensions, whereas PC replaces the actual number of 
metrical correlated variables by a smaller number of uncorrelated variables. These new 
uncorrelated variables contain most of the information from the original set of 
variables (Bartholomew et. al 2002:81 and 115).   
 
In short all techniques reveal the latent structures of the data but visualises them in 
different ways.  Even so, regarding the data sets employed in this thesis PC and CA 
may be the most suitable techniques. This because both trace the latent structure of 
nominally or ordinally scaled data, hence the data does not need to be measured on an 
interval level (as in FA). The two techniques are also especially suitable when the 
research design involves a small number of cases, like the DEU data employed in this 
thesis.  
 
2.3.3 Data Preparation 
This thesis has treated missing values of the DEU data set in the same way that 
Zimmer et al (2005:409) has treated them. Issues where the preference positions are 
unknown for more than four member states were discarded from the analysis. The 
reason for this is simple. If more than 30 % of the member states‟ positions are 
unknown it would be difficult to determine the political space of the Council 
accurately. Hence it is better to remove those issues from the analysis.  Other missing 
scores were given the mean score of the reference point (status quo of that particular 
policy) and the position of the Commission. In this way the member states that could 
not be given a preference score during the expert interviews were attributed a neutral 
position.  
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15 issues had more than four missing scores, and were hence discarded from the 
analysis. The new number of issues is a total of 159 issues, but the number of 
proposals is still 70, the same as the original dataset
9
. This is because neither of the 
issues removed influenced the number of proposals. See appendix A for a complete list 
of the issues that were removed from the analysis. When the reference point was 
unknown (i.e because the Commission was introducing a new policy) this thesis chose 
to give the member states that lacked a preference score the value 0. Zimmer et al. do 
not mention what they have done in this particular situation, but since this just affect 
three of the 159 issues and just three member states (one missing on each issue 
dimension), it is not likely that this choice will affect the overall reliability and validity 
of the analyses.  
 
The voting data originally links each country‟s votes to which government each 
country has on any given time. This means that if one country had three governments 
during the time period of the data set, three variables would measure its actual voting 
behaviour. Since the DEU data does not explicitly measures such shifts in government, 
it has been constructed one voting behaviour variable for each Council member. 
Except from this the voting data has been used in its original form.  
 
In order to test the simple spatial model, each proposal presented in the DEU data has 
been given the mean value of all the issues attached to it. Thus, if one proposal X 
consisted of three issues and country Y had the values 80, 100 and 80 on these issues, 
its position on proposal X is estimated as 87. The justification for this arrangement is 
that even though a proposal may consist of more than one issue; the data shows that 
each member state often have the same tendency on all three issues. And if this is not 
the case, the reference points (the status quo) and the decision outcomes linked to 
every single issue may equalise this problem. This because the reference point and the 
decision outcome on each proposal also are estimated as means based on the number 
                                                     
9
 Zimmer et a (2005) do not mention how many issues they discarded from the analysis, but 15 is the number of 
issues this thesis removed from the analysis after following the information given in the original study. 
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of issues (and hence number of outcomes and number of reference points) attached to 
each proposal.  
 
There are two main challenges in relation to the research design of this thesis. First, 
comparing the controversial proposals in the DEU data set with all the proposals in the 
same time period may be problematic, and then go on by using the proposals identified 
in both data sets as a basis for saying something about voting behaviour in the Council 
may propose difficulties. The extent of these problems will be determined by 
employing a t-test in chapter 4.  
 
Second there are a variety of problems attached to the simple spatial model, and the 
employment of it. Chapter 5 will address these problems in practice by modelling the 
tobacco directive explicitly, and chapter 6 will evaluate the model in detail and 
compare its performance with the performance of an alternative model.  
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3 CHAPTER 3: A REPLICATION OF ZIMMER ET AL. 
 
3.1 The Political Space of the Council 
This chapter will compare the analysis of Zimmer et al. (2005), which reveals a three-
dimensional conflict structure, with a replicated study with the same research design, 
as outlined in the previous chapter.  
But instead of just relying on one explicit technique (correspondence analysis) this 
chapter will employ other different techniques (factor analysis, principal component 
analysis, multidimensional scaling and hierarchical clustering) as well. This will 
enable the thesis to discuss the findings of both their study and the replicated study in a 
broader methodological setting. The last sections of this chapter will then go on by 
comparing these findings with the main findings in the Council literature. 
 
3.2 Dimensions in the Council: Comparing the Results 
The results of the different analyses of the replicated study (se tables 3.1) show that 
method plays a considerable role when defining the political space of the Council. If 
we are to rely upon a decision rule advocating that each dimension must explain more 
than 10 % of the total variance to be considered important, only the results of the 
factor analysis justifies to be labelled a three dimensional model.  
 
Table 3-1 Results: Replication of Zimmer et al. (FA, PC and CA) 
 
Different models 1 dimensional model 2 dimensional model 3 dimensional model 
FA: 
Explained variation in % 
25,5% 47,5 % 57,8% 
PC: 
Explained variation in % 
39,1% 59,2% 65,9% 
CA: 
Explained variation in % 
42,5% 52,1% 60,1% 
 
 
The PC analysis and the CA analysis reveal, instead, a two dimensional structure of 
the Council. The 10 % decision rule could of course be discussed, but if we decrease 
this threshold another problem will occur since the difference between the third and 
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the fourth dimension of the analyses is so small. If we include three dimensions, why 
not include the fourth too? Hence a 10 % rule could be justified in this context.  
 
When looking at the results of the analytical techniques that are most suitable for this 
kind of data set, PC and CA, the two dimensional model explains 59,2 % and 52,1 % 
of the total variance respectively. The main difference between these two techniques 
were outlined in chapter 2, and it is interesting to see that the first dimension in the CA 
has a more important role (when explaining the total variance) than the role of the first 
dimension in the PC. Regarding the PC, the second and third dimension explains a lot 
more of the variance than their counterparts in the CA.  
 
The three dimensional model derived from the correspondence analysis of Zimmer et 
al (2005) explains, in contrast, 53,7 % of the total variance, so the results of this 
replication study and the results of the original study differs to some extent when we 
compare the total variance explained in each study. This shows that replicating 
quantitative analyses are not an easy task, and these differences in numbers could 
support the argument that researchers need to improve their documentation regarding 
how they have conducted their analysis. But if we employ the 10 % decision rule on 
the original study from 2005 the results of this study will, as the replication study, 
advocate a two dimensional structure of the Council that explains 44,8% of the total 
variance: 
 
Table 3-2 Possible interpretations of the Dimensions in DEU (Zimmer et al 2005:411) 
 
 D1 D2 Explained 
vairiation, 2D-
model 
D3 Explained 
variation, 
3D-model 
DEU Market 
regulation, 
subsidies 
Consumer 
protection, 
subsidies 
44,8% Subsidies, 
economic 
interests 
protectionism 
53,7% 
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When we have a closer look on how the member states position themselves in this two 
dimensional space, the CA plot of the replication study (figure 3.1) and the CA plot of 
the original study (figure 3.2) show almost identical structures.  
 
 
Figure 3-1 Replication study: (CA)                  Figure 3-2 Original study CA                                                                                                     
                                                                                               Zimmer et al (2005:410) 
                  
 
 
Both plots show a grouping of France, Spain (Espäna), Greece, Italy and to some 
extent Portugal. The Nordic countries are also grouped together in both plots (Sweden 
and Denmark have almost identical points) and the Netherlands and the UK (GB) are 
also placed close to each other.  Ireland has the same place in both plots, but 
Luxembourg is closer to Ireland in the original study. Belgium is also placed 
somewhat different in this study, and Austria and Germany are more outliers here than 
in the replication study. But the differences between the two structures can be 
accounted for by the difference in dimensions considered. Zimmer et al. consider three 
dimensions in their analysis, whereas this analysis employs two dimensions.  When 
plotting the CA of the replication study in three dimensions it is likely that the already 
small differences between the two analyses will get even smaller. The similarities in 
dimensional structure shows that the results of the replication study and the results of 
the original study do not differ in a significant manner.  
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Also the plots of principal component analysis (PC), hierarchical clustering (HC) and 
multidimensional scaling (MDS) reveal quite similar dimensional structures when it 
comes to the distances between- and the groupings of the member states (see figure 
3.3, figure 3.4 and figure 3.5). 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Replication study (PC)                              Figure 3-4 Replication study (MDS) 
 
 
The PC also shows a loose bloc of southern European countries like Greece, Spain, 
France, Portugal and Italy. But the Nordic bloc is not that evident in this plot. UK and 
the Netherlands are again quite close each other and the same are to be said for 
Luxembourg and Ireland, the two smallest countries of the EU.  As in figure 3.1 
Germany and Austria are close to each other also in this plot. 
 
The MDS plot also shows a clear Nordic bloc, a southern bloc and pairings of 
Germany and Austria and the Netherlands and the UK. Once again Belgium is closer 
to southern-European countries than its more northern neighbours. Mattila and Lane 
(2001:44-45) also employ MDS as a visual displaying technique, and their plot also 
shows a southern bloc of Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Hence the MDS plot 
(Figure 3.4) to some extent overlaps with the analysis of Mattila and Lane which 
indicates that a north-south division is the main cleavage in the Council.  
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Figure 3-5 Replication study: hierarchical clustering 
 
 
The HC plot shows two main clusters: One with Greece, Portugal, France, Spain, 
Belgium and Italy and one with Germany, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, UK, Ireland, Austria and Luxembourg. This division could to some 
extent be detected in the other four presented plots as well. Further on the Nordic 
countries form a separate cluster, as well as the Netherlands and the UK. Both these 
findings are consistent with the two CA plots and the MDS plot. Overall this shows 
that the patterns are quite consistent independently of what technique that has been 
employed. 
 
3.3 Interpreting the Dimensions 
Before trying to interpret the results of the replication study, some reservations have to 
be made. The Council decides over a variety of complicated and very detailed topics. 
And since the content of the dimensions revealed through this kind of analysis is 
highly dependent on the issues at hand, it is difficult to draw explicit conclusions on 
the general conflict structure within the Council.  Also, in correspondence analysis the 
interpretation of the policy content of the dimensions is based upon the columns 
(issues) with extreme component loadings (Zimmer et al 2005:410), making it difficult 
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to subscribe substantial content to the different dimensions revealed through the 
analysis.  
 
It is not possible to say something about absolute positions. The positions of the 
member states that are revealed through the different analyses can hence only be 
interpreted relatively to each other. And it is not certain that the scales applied to the 
different plots are the same, even though we cannot say that the scales, in fact, are 
different from each other. So we have to be aware of all these problems when 
interpreting the dimensions. 
 
It  is possible to interpret the dimensions obtained from the CA (and the PC) by 
examining the position of row/column categories along each dimension and thinking 
about what row/column categories, that appears to make natural groupings, have in 
common (Bartholomew et al. 2002:95).  The plots provide a visual display of such 
groupings of row/column categories.  
 
 
When looking at figure 3.1 it is evidently that these analyses supports the north-south 
dimension advocated by Mattila (2006) and Mattila and Lane (2001). The northern 
countries (like for instance Austria, Denmark, Sweden, UK, Germany and Finland) 
seem to make one grouping, and Spain, France, Portugal, Italy and Greece another 
(southern) grouping. The north-south dimension has been criticised for lacking 
theoretical justification, but Zimmer et al (2005) advocates that the north-south 
dimension may be incorporated in the theoretically supported redistributive dimension. 
Hence the conflict between the north and the south, can rather be seen as a conflict 
between the net-contributors (the north) and the net-receivers (the south). The northern 
countries who only make small net-contributions (like Finland) can be still be a part of 
the northern block because of so-called cultural connectedness, aka “you do as your 
neighbour does” (Zimmer et al 2005:411). Hence this replication study clearly can be 
taken as supporting the redistributive dimension of Zimmer et al (2005), where the two 
dimensions are subdivisions of the general redistributive dimension and may touch 
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upon different economical conflicts of the EU (i.e. market regulation and consumer 
protection). 
 
Another possible interpretation of the plots is that the two dimensional political space 
is governed by the frequently advocated left-right dimension and the more or less 
integration-dimension.  The first dimension of the CA (figure 3.1) could be the left-
right dimension and the second dimension could be the more or less integration-
dimension leaving the UK at a traditionally defensive position as one of the most free 
market and least integrationist member states (Hix 2005, Zimmer et al. 2005). 
This chapter does not find any particular support for the large vs. small countries-
dimension advocated by Mattila (2004). The CA plots do not reveal explicit groupings 
of small countries and other groupings of big countries, except for the coalition of the 
Nordic countries which could also be explained by cultural connectedness (Elgström et 
al. 2001) or similarities in political and economical structures (Hix 2005:87).  
 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter has replicated the study of Zimmer et al (2005). The results show that 
method does matter to some extent when determining the political space of the 
Council of Ministers, although the pattern of conflict seems to be stable no matter 
what method we choose to employ. The analysis has revealed a two dimensional 
space, and the two dimensions can be said to support both the notion of a redistributive 
dimension and the more general notion that ideology and integration speed determines 
the positions of the EU member states. Hence this thesis supports the main findings of 
Zimmer et al (2005), but also some of the main findings of Mattila (2004 and 2006). 
The notions discussed in this chapter will be elaborated upon in more detail in the next 
chapter that compares the results from the correspondence analysis of the DEU data 
with a similar analysis of the voting data. 
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4 CHAPTER 4: POSITIONS VERSUS ACTUAL VOTES 
 
4.1 Introduction to a Comparative Analysis 
It is essential to compare positions with actual votes in order to determine whether the 
Council members vote sincere or whether their voting behaviour may be governed by 
strategic considerations. But before determining this it could be useful to define the 
differences between the two data sets by employing correspondence analysis as the 
analytical tool of choice. 
 
The structure is as follows:  The first section of this chapter compares the DEU data 
with voting data stretching from the period from January 1999 – December 2002 (654 
acts) because this is the overlapping time period between the two datasets. Of the 70 
proposals in the Thomson data, unfortunately only 44 of them can be identified in the 
Council Minutes. There can be a variety of reasons for this, and the problems the lack 
of coherence represent for this thesis will be adequately addressed in this chapter. 
Hence the second section compares the different data constellations employed in this 
thesis by focusing on the mean values in order to reveal if there are any significant 
differences to detect. This is an important comparison since the DEU project only 
explores the most controversial proposals of the overlapping time period. Hence the 
critical questions are whether the 44 proposals, that are included in the DEU data, are 
significantly different from the rest of the proposal universe, and whether the selection 
of 44 proposals is significantly different from the 70 proposals originally considered 
by the DEU project. 
 
The third section will compare the overlapping proposals of the two datasets in the 
same way as the first section, by employing correspondence analysis. The member 
states‟ positions on the 44 proposals of the Thomson data set are calculated by giving 
each member state a position which equals the mean value of the issues attached to 
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each proposal
10
.The fourth section summarise the findings and place them in a broader 
empirical setting. 
4.2 The Results: All Positions versus all Votes 
When comparing the results of the previous DEU correspondence analysis with the 
results of the correspondence analysis (hereafter the CA) of the actual voting data, it is 
evident that only the actual voting data can defend a three dimensional model when we 
use the previously explained 10% decision rule. The two dimensional DEU model 
explains 52,1% of the total variance while the three dimensional voting data model 
explains 40,8% of the total variance: 
 
Table 4-1 Results CA: Both Datasets 
 
Different models 1 dimensional model 2 dimensional model 3 dimensional model 
DEU: 
Explained variation in % 
42,5% 52,1% 60,1% 
Voting data: 
Explained variation in % 
15,6% 29,5% 40,8% 
 
This gap in explained variance can be anticipated since the possible distributions of 
row categories over the column categories and vice versa differ in the two data sets 
(Bartholomew et al. 2002: 80). The voting data has only two values: 1 (yes) and 0 
(no), and since the proportion of negative votes is very low it is little variation to 
detect in this data. The extent to which row/column distributions vary across the 
column/row categories is hence much smaller in the voting data than in the data based 
on positions. The latter has values from 0-100, and has much more room for possible 
variation. Because of this it is more useful for this thesis to compare the plots of the 
two CAs than the different levels of explained variation, even though also the CA plots 
should be treated with caution since the two data sets are so different in terms of 
distributions. 
 
The plots vary to some degree when it comes to determining the political space in the 
Council. The DEU plot (figure 4.1) finds (as previously discussed) support for a north-
                                                     
10
 See chapter 2 for justification for this. 
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south dimension, a left-right dimension and a more-or less integration dimension, and 
render it possible to incorporate the north-south dimension as a sub-dimension in the 
more theoretically founded redistributive dimension. But the comparison of this CA 
plot with the voting data CA plot (figure 4.3), shows that these dimensions cannot be 
supported to such a high extent by an analysis based on actual voting data: 
 
 
Figure 4-1 (as in chapter 3):   Figure 4-2 
DEU: All positions                          DEU: 44 positions 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3                                           Figure 4-4 
Voting data: All votes                Voting data: 44 votes 
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The voting data plot rather shows a grouping of small countries like Luxembourg, 
Ireland, Austria and Denmark, while the two largest countries, Germany and France, 
are considerably closer to each other here than in the DEU plot. This makes “the large 
versus small countries dimension”, that is supported by Mattila (2004:45), much more 
evident in the voting data than in the position data. It is interesting to note that also this 
is a dimension that to some degree can be incorporated in the redistributive dimension 
advocated by Zimmer et al. (2005), many of the large countries are the net-
contributors (Germany contributes the most) to the EU budget whereas many of the 
smaller countries, like for instance Ireland, are among the net-beneficiaries.  
 
In the voting data plot the UK is once again at a counterpoint, but this time it is closer 
to a cluster of smaller countries as well as Spain. The constellation of southern 
countries and the Nordic cluster that can be detected in the position data plot is not 
supported by the voting data plot, leaving an impression of little coherence between 
the two correspondence analyses. But once again this could be explained by the low 
proportion of negative votes in the voting data. It is important to have in mind that it is 
only the successfully adopted proposals that are a part of this data set, and this leaves 
naturally little room for variation among the countries. 
 
4.3 Explaining and Determining the Selection Problems 
Of the 70 proposals in the DEU data set only 44 of them could be found in the Council 
Minutes, and hence in the voting data that are based on the Council Minutes and the 
statements posted at the Council website. There could be a variety of explanations for 
this.  
 
It could be, that the Council chose not to publish the minutes linked to some of the 
missing proposals that where on the agenda already prior to 1999. This because the 
Council increased their level of transparency, as issued by the Treaty establishing the 
European Community (TEC), by publishing the Council minutes at the website for the 
first time in February 1999 leaving their decisions prior to this unavailable for the 
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public (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006: 125 and the Council website). 12 of the 26 
missing proposals have been on the agenda before 1999 (see appendix A for details on 
these proposals). Moreover, one of these 12 proposals (CNS/1996/160: “Council 
Regulation (EC) No 850/98 of 30 March 1998 for the conservation of fishery 
resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine 
organisms”) was decided upon before 1999 (Thomson et al 2006:318), and is hence 
not a part of the actual voting data. Another proposal
11
 (COD/1995/341: Proposal for a 
13
th
 European Parliament and Council Directive on company law concerning takeover 
bids) was rejected by the European Parliament, and thus not exists in the actual voting 
data. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006:125) also stresses that the online register of 
council documents does not necessarily include all legal acts. Some Council Minutes 
may be classified as limité, and are not directly- or completely available. This may 
also contribute to explain why 26 proposals cannot be identified in the voting data. 
 
Further on, of the proposals that have been reconsidered and changed quite a few times 
over the years, it is likely that only the latter versions of this directive or decision are 
included in the Council Minutes. A thoroughly reading of the Council Minutes
12
, and a 
subsequent examination of the actual voting data supports this notion. 
 
Another explanation for the gap between the DEU data and the Council Minutes could 
be that the proposal in the DEU data may have been included as separate decisions in 
the Council minutes (Hagemann 2007:126), hence making it difficult to match the 
proposals with each other. But this is not very likely to affect the data of this thesis 
since Thomson et al. have included the decision outcome in the DEU data set. Any 
how, it could be possible that they have only found the decision outcome related to one 
of, for instance a total of, three issues, making it likely to link the initial proposal to a, 
in fact, separate decision.  
 
                                                     
11
 This proposal is not included in the group of the 12 proposals that were on the agenda prior to 1999, because 
the DEU data does not mention (explicitly) the date it was voted upon. 
12
 The author of this thesis have read all the Council Minutes in the time period under scrutiny in order to make 
sure that the analysis should be as accurate as possible. 
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It is also to be said that the Official Journal of the European Union , accounts for some 
information on the proposals that cannot be detected in the Council Minutes (Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace 2006:125). So it could be that the Council some times only 
chose to document parts of their decisions through this channel, leaving data based on 
the Council Minutes to some extent not updated on every single Council decision. 
Finally it may be that some member states refuse to make their positions on a proposal 
public. The member states are still allowed to this, although it has occurred only nine 
times since 1999 (Hagemann 2007:27). It has not been possible to obtain information 
on which proposals that are affected by this rare phenomenon, but it could be likely 
that some of the missing proposals would be accounted for in this way. 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, the missing proposals represent some problems for this 
thesis. The main drawback is that the missing proposals make a complete comparison 
of both data sets impossible. This leaves us with the question: Would the results of the 
correspondence analyses and the results of the simple spatial model test be very 
different if this thesis could compare all 70 proposals instead of the overlapping 44? 
And does the controversial selection criteria, that is applied in the DEU project, 
restrain the possibility to generalise the results of this thesis‟s analysis to the rest of the 
proposal universe? These questions could be answered by comparing the mean values 
of the four different data constellations, employing a t-test that compares the mean 
values of two separate selections. By comparing the mean values of the DEU data set 
and the DEU 44 data set, and using the difference between the two values as the 
fundament for a test observator, it is possible to test if “m1= m2” or if  “m1” actually 
is significantly different from “m2” (Skog 2007:180-183). The test is done accordingly 
to the formulas presented in Skog (2007), and is also employed at the voting data set 
and at the voting 44 data set.  
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The results of the two tests are as follows: 
 
 
Table 4-2 T-test of mean values (all datasets) 
 
*p =< .05 
 
Since the degrees of freedom are the sum of the proposals in both groups minus 2, the 
degrees of freedom are 112 in the DEU pairs and 696 in the voting data pairs. This 
means that the critical T-value is plus/minus 1,98 in both tests if we employ a 5% level 
of significance (Skog 2007:182). The results of the DEU test show that neither of the 
mean value-pairings is significantly different from each other. The same holds for the 
voting data test, with one exception: Ireland. This is because during the 44 overlapping 
proposals Ireland did not oppose the decisions at all, and hence the related T-value is 
much higher than the other countries‟ T-values. 
 
From these two T-tests it is possible to draw two conclusions that are of high 
importance to this thesis when moving on with the analyses: 
1) The results of the correspondence analyses and the results of the simple spatial 
model test, both based on the 44 overlapping proposals, would not differ significantly 
Country Mean DEU 
70 
Mean DEU 
44 
T-value 
pairwise 
DEU 
Mean 
Voting 
Data 
1999-2002 
(654) 
Mean 
Voting 
Data  
44 
T-value 
pairwise 
Voting 
Data 
Germany 48,43 43,51 -0,6900 0,9679 0,9545 -0,4132 
France 56,15 59,88 0,5121 0,9587 0,9545 -0,1288 
UK 46,74 45.54   -0,1761 0,9725 0,9318   -1,0653 
Italy 56,38 58,51 0,3008 0,945 0,9318 -0,3407 
Spain 54,45 59,00 0,6799 0,9664 0,9091 -1,2940 
Netherlands 46,13 47,39 0,1857 0,9495 0,9091 -0,9067 
Greece 51,52 51,99 0,0694 0,9694 0,9318 -0,9825 
Belgium 52,79 56,49 0,5310 0,9801 0,9318 -1,2682 
Portugal 53,38 54,67   0,1927 0,9633 0,8864 -1,5755 
Sweden 51,09 52,44 0,2029 0,9602 0,9773 0,71466 
Austria 48,97 47,90 -0,1671 0,9862 0,9545 -0,9904 
Denmark 51,75 48,93 -0,4360 0,9755 0,9545 -0,6522 
Finland 53,61 51,79 -0,2706 0,974 0,9773 0,14064 
Ireland 48,99 50,44 0,2182 0,9847 1 3,2606* 
Luxembourg 48,11 50,37 0,3310 0,9908 0,9545 -1,1380 
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from the results that could have been detected with a complete universe of overlapping 
proposals.  
2) The controversial proposals in the DEU data set do not differ from the proposal 
universe of the same time period, when it comes to the actual voting behaviour of the 
Council members. 
But this does not mean that the proposal universe (1999-2002) is similar to the 70 
proposals of the DEU data set in terms of the amount of time and debate attached to 
each proposal before the last step of decision-making
13
. The T-test does not rule out 
that the proposals of the DEU data set are more controversial that others when it 
comes to preparatory stages and various negotiations, both in the Council and between 
the EU institutions.   
 
4.4 The Results: 44 positions versus 44 votes 
The results of the two correspondence analyses justify that both data constellations can 
be modelled in three dimensions, even if we employ the 10% decision rule (see table 
4.3).  Although this makes plotting the data in two dimensions a bit inadequate, it can 
be argued that such a plot still illustrates the data in a sufficient manner. A two-
dimensional “DEU 44 model” explains 51% of the total variance, while a two-
dimensional “voting data 44 model” explains 39,9% of the total variance.  
 
Table 4-3 Results 44 proposals correspondence analysis (CA)  
 
Different models 1 dimensional model 2 dimensional model 3 dimensional model 
DEU: 
Explained variation in % 
36,5% 51% 63,1% 
Voting data: 
Explained variation in % 
21,8% 39,9% 54,2% 
 
The two-dimensional  “DEU 44 model” explains roughly as much as the two-
dimensional “DEU all positions” model, but the two-dimensional “voting data 44 
model” explains roughly as much as the three-dimensional “voting data all votes” 
model. The differences between the two voting data models can of course be explained 
                                                     
13
 See chapter 6 for more elaboration on the time frames attached to the decision-making processes. 
48 
 
  
by the differences in size between the two selections,that are much bigger than the 
differences between the two DEU selections. 
 
When looking at the plots of the “44 proposals” two-dimensional models (see figure 
4.2 and figure 4.4) it is clear that the “DEU 44” plot is in general quite similar to the 
”DEU all positions” plot (figure 4.1).  The northern countries form one group and the 
southern countries another, making it possible to argue for the existence of a 
redistributive dimension as previously discussed. This finding may also support the 
notion that coalitions are likely to form between governments with similar policy 
goals, interests and political- and economical structures (Hix 2005:87).  
 
This applies especially to the grouping of Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, the 
cluster of Germany and the Netherlands and the southern grouping of France, Italy and 
Greece which to some degree also includes Spain and Portugal. The groups of northern 
and southern countries may thus be explained by the groups‟ differences in regulation 
modes. In political economy the groups are attributed distinctive varieties of capitalism 
that are categorised by specific organisational structures ( Hall 1999:143). The policy 
paths that the member states can pursue successfully may hence often be affected by 
the existing structure of the states‟ political economy (Hall 1999:161).The Rhine 
model (close relationship between banks and industries) and the different variants of 
organised capitalism or coordinated market economies may illustrate the northern 
group, whereas high government regulation and intervention as well as social 
oligopolies may be common features of the Southern-European states (Hall 1999 and 
Boyer 1997). Elaborating further on these arguments it is possible to explain the more 
isolated position of the UK (in figure 4.1 and to some degree 4.3) with the country‟s 
liberal market economy, that differs from the coordinated market economies in for 
instance its focus on short –term profitability and its lack of representative 
organisations and central coordination of the employers‟ interests (Hall 1999:143-
144). The economic- and social structures of the member states may hence play a role 
in explaining the voting behaviour of the Council. This notion may also incorporate to 
some extent the “cultural connectedness”-argument, where countries with similarities 
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in cultural traditions and language are supposed to vote together (Elgström et al. 
2001). 
 
 In relation to this it is interesting to note that the Nordic grouping are much less 
evident in the “DEU 44” plot than in the “DEU all positions” plot. This finding may 
suggest that Sweden, Finland and Denmark voted more “together” on the missing 26 
proposals than the 44 proposals there are overlapping data on. 
 
The “voting data 44” plot (figure 4.4) is a lot harder to interpret; basically this can 
again be explained by the huge difference in selection size. It is although interesting to 
see that there is possible to detect three groups of countries. Sweden, France, Ireland 
and Finland form one group, Italy, Belgium, Spain, UK and Netherlands another and 
lastly it can be seen a less tight cluster of Luxembourg, Austria, Denmark, Greece and 
Germany. Once again (as in the three other plots) it seems like Luxembourg and 
Austria are voting in a similar manner, whereas Portugal again takes a more isolated 
position.  
 
Apart from the mentioned findings the plot represents a bit of an exception from the 
norm of groupings of large and small countries and/or northern and southern countries 
that the other plots have revealed. Even so the group of Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Spain and UK are all among the 8 largest member states of the EU 15 (Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace 2006:264-265), suggesting that the dimension of large versus 
small countries also may apply to this plot as it did to the “voting data all votes” plot 
(figure 4.3). This particular group of countries can also be linked to the analyses of 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006:282-283). Their analyses show that the 
Netherlands, Italy and the UK are among the five most frequent “no”-voters (together 
with Germany and Denmark). 
 
50 
 
  
4.5 Summarising the Findings 
This chapter has explored the similarities and differences of the correspondence 
analyses of four different data constellations, as well as determining the implications 
of the “selection problems”. The chapter has done four main findings: 
 Both the actual voting data and the position data reveal support for a redistributive 
dimension, as advocated by Zimmer et al (2005). Either in terms of northern versus 
southern member states or in form of big member states versus the smaller member 
states. 
 All four data constellations suggest to some degree that the Council members often 
vote the same way as their geographical neighbours. This finding supports the 
notion that member states with similarities in interests, political goals and economy 
vote together (Hix 2005:87 and Hall 1999). The related political economy 
argument may also be a more theoretical fundament for the north versus south 
dimension as well as a more familiar and recognised explanation related to the 
conflict structure of the Council in general. 
 Overall the two-dimensional model of the political space of the Council is a better 
fit than a three-dimensional model. This is to be said; if we employ a ten percent 
decision rule, and take into account the percents of variance that each dimension of 
the models explains. This suggests that the bargaining is more likely to centre 
around one- or two main-dimensions, rather than three dimensions.  
 The differences between the data selections, which exist mainly because of the 
difficulties attached to finding the overlapping proposals of the position data and 
the voting data, are not significant. In practice (when voting) the controversial 
proposals of the DEU data set do not differ significantly when compared to all the 
proposals from the same time period. This means that “the selection problems” do 
no restrain the findings of this thesis in any significant way.  
 
But to put the results of the CAs in perspective, these results have to be linked more 
specifically to a theory of decision-making. Hence this thesis will now use the results 
from this chapter when structuring the test of a simple spatial model of voting 
behaviour in order to determine its explanatory force. 
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5 CHAPTER 5: TESTING THE SIMPLE SPATIAL MODEL 
 
5.1 What defines Voting Behaviour? 
The research question of this thesis “Can positions on single-issues explain voting 
behaviour in the Council of Ministers” can be tested (as previously mentioned) by 
employing a simple spatial model. If the Council members actually vote accordingly to 
their preferences the answer to the research question will be yes. If the opposite is true, 
we have to look for alternative explanations. This chapter will now test the model by 
comparing the overlapping proposals of the two data sets. By doing this it is possible 
to draw explicit conclusions on each member state‟s performance in relation to the 
model. The main contribution of this thesis is hence that the two data sets combined 
facilitate the opportunity to reveal the consistency between positions and actual 
votes/statements. So by merging the two data sets it is possible to make a contribution 
to the existing literature on this field.  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: The first section presents how it is possible 
to test the performance of the simple spatial model, and illustrates this by employing 
the Tobacco Directive as an example. The second section evaluates the performance of 
the simple spatial model, both its aggregative performance and how it performs in 
relation to each Council member‟s voting behaviour. Throughout this section the 
findings presented are also compared to the findings from the existing Council 
literature on this topic. 
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5.2 Testing the Models 
The logic behind the simple spatial model was outlined in chapter 2, by employing this 
figure:
 
Figure 5-1 A Simple Spatial Model 
 
 
Since this thesis has access to both the member states‟ ideal positions and the decision 
outcomes (both can be found in the DEU data), this data can be matched with the 
voting data revealing how the Council members actually did vote on the 44 proposals 
that the data sets have in common. The ideal positions (the predicted positions), the 
decision outcomes, the reference points and the actual votes are all the information that 
this thesis needs in order to do an adequate test of the validity and reliability of the 
simple spatial model. The test can hence determine whether the simple spatial model is 
a useful tool for explaining the voting behaviour of the Council, or if the model has to 
be complemented by other explanations. Unfortunately the DEU data lacks the 
position of the decision outcome in a total of seven proposals, making 37 the actual 
total of proposals that can be employed in the testing of the simple spatial model (see 
Appendix B for information on which proposals that does not include the position of 
the decision outcome). 
 
In order to show the logic behind the test of this model and some problems attached to 
it, this thesis will use an explicit proposal (one of the proposals included in the testing) 
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as an illustration. Consider the Tobacco Directive: “Directive 2001/37/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 on the approximation of the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the 
manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products”. This directive outlines 
regulations for the supervision of all forms of tobacco products. In more detail, it 
prohibits the use of terms like “light” and “mild” and brand-names that advertise with 
“less harmful” tobacco. Moreover, it means that warning texts on tobacco products 
will be increased in size, and that maximum permitted yield levels (of nicotine, tar and 
carbon monoxide) should also apply for products manufactured in the EU, but 
intended for export to third countries (EurActiv).  Thomson et al (2006:331) describe 
this decision outcome as a victory for the health lobby, but is this decision outcome 
also a victory for the performance of the simple spatial model? A closer look on the 
predicted positions- and the actual votes/statements of the Council Members in 
relation to this explicit example may give us an answer to this question. Hence based 
on the DEU data and the voting records data the Tobacco Directive can be modelled in 
this way: 
 
 
Figure 5-2 The Tobacco Directive 
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Figure 5.2 shows that the model performs quite well when trying to predict how the 
actors would vote on this directive. It manages to predict right three out of five 
negative statements. Luxembourg, Austria and Greece were negative towards the 
directive both in the DEU data and the actual voting data. But if the model was to 
perform perfectly, it had to position Portugal and Germany at the left side of the 
indifferent point (39) too. Since both Germany and Portugal were among the six least 
positive members on this proposal, the model at least seems to predict the general 
(ordered) preference distribution of the Council accurately. The model states that 
Luxembourg, Austria and Greece will prefer status quo over the decision outcome (X), 
whereas the other Council members prefer X over status quo. The Council Minutes 
reveal that Austria, Luxembourg and Germany abstained from voting (and in practice 
voted “no”), and this means that Greece and Portugal issued their negative opinions 
through formal statements
14
. It is to be said that all five of the actual negative council 
members could not have expressed their negative preference through voting in order to 
make the voting records (5/7 must vote “yes” in order to reach a decision or more 
explicit 62 out of 87 votes).  
 
This may suggest that Portugal perhaps was not that evidently negative since it did not 
abstain from voting/voted “no” and was not positioned as negative towards the 
directive. Or it may suggest that Portugal, for instance, gained some bargains in its 
favour in the last rounds of negotiations and hence did not propose an actual threat 
against successful decision-making. Any how, the Tobacco Directive is the only one of 
the 37 proposals, which are included in the testing, that has more than four actual 
negative statements. This means, that the negative statements of the voting data may 
correspond to a high degree with the abstentions/negative votes that are cited in the 
Council minutes. This again, means that the performance of the simple spatial model 
may be tested in an adequate way. 
 
                                                     
14
 Formal statements can be included in the Council minutes or posted afterwards on the Council‟s website 
(Hagemann 2006:81). In this case they were not included in the minutes. 
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In order to determine the reliability and the validity of the simple spatial model the test 
will make use of recall and precision for measuring the model‟s goodness of fit when 
it comes to voting behaviour in the Council of Ministers. Whereas recall is a measure 
of completeness, precision measures the exactness of the model. Generally, 
researchers are interested in obtaining high levels of precision in conjunction with high 
(or reasonable) levels of recall (Cardie and Wilkerson 2008:3).  High levels of both 
precision and recall are hence the criteria for good performance of the simple spatial 
model.  
 
More explicitly, the precision test determines how many predicted positive votes 
which are actually positive and how many predicted negative votes which are actually 
negative. In other words precision asks: What percentage of the annotations (votes) 
proposed by the model is correct when compared to the gold standard (how they 
actually voted)? The recall test identifies how many of the actual positive votes that 
are also predicted positive, and how many of the actual negative votes that are 
predicted negative as well. The recall test answers the question: What percentage of 
the annotations (votes) in the gold standard is identified correctly by the model? 
(Cardie and Wilkerson 2008:3). Together the two measures may give a nuanced 
picture of the performance of the spatial model. 
 
5.3 Testing the Models: Discussing the Results 
5.3.1 Structuring the Discussion 
When testing the model the thesis will divide the council members into groups based 
on the previous results of this thesis and the redistributive dimension supported by the 
Council literature. The natural 4 groupings in relation to these criteria are:  
 Germany, France and UK: This group consists of the three largest countries of the 
EU, and Germany and UK are also the two largest net contributors to the EU 
budget. (Zimmer et al. 2005:411). Germany and France
15
 vote in a similar manner 
                                                     
15
 Even though France receive relatively high sums of agricultural and structural funds (Zimmer et al. 2005), this 
thesis will still argue that a constellation of the three largest countries may be justified for this discussion. 
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according to “the voting data all votes” plot, and have historically been labelled the 
Paris-Bonn axis (Hix 2005:87). 
 Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Austria: These four countries vote in a 
similar manner according to at least one of the previously examined CA plots. 
Luxembourg and Austria were close to each other in all four CA plots, and the 
Benelux-countries are more economically and politically integrated than any other 
grouping in the EU (Hix 2005:87). 
 Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland: Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy voted 
together as a southern grouping in the two DEU CA plots as well as in the HC plot, 
MDS plot and the PC plot. The inclusion of Ireland in this grouping is supported by 
the notion of a cohesion bloc of the less prosperous member states that receive 
funding from the EU structural funds. The cohesion bloc includes, according to Hix 
(2005:87), Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, but Zimmer et al. (2005:411) 
argues that Italy also has received high sums of agricultural and structural funds 
since the mid-1990s. These five countries may also be interconnected because of 
their economical structures and interests.  
 Sweden, Denmark and Finland: The Nordic member states were a tight cluster in 
the “DEU all positions” CA plot and in the HC- and MDS plots. The Nordic 
countries have close political, economical and cultural ties- and structures making 
coalitions and compliance convergence between these three countries very likely 
(Hix 2005:87 and Sverdrup 2004). 
 
The thesis will first discuss the simple spatial model‟s aggregative performance, and 
then examine the model performance in relation to these four groups of member states 
more closely. 
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5.3.2 The Aggregative Performance of the Simple Spatial Model 
 
 
Table 5-1 Aggregative model
16
: 
 
                Actual: 
 
Predicted: 
Yes 
 
No Precision 
Yes 392 20 392/412= 
95% 
No 131 12 12/143= 
8,5% 
 
Recall 
392/523= 
75% 
12/32= 
37,5% 
 
 
The aggregative performance of the simple spatial model shows that the model 
manages to predict the extent - (the completeness) and the accuracy (the exactness) of 
the positive votes quite well.  
 
But the main flaw related to the reliability of the simple spatial model is that it over-
determines the extent of the “no” votes, making the exactness measurement of the 
data‟s‟ negative votes (statements) perform poorly as well. The latter relates to when 
some countries does not oppose any of the decisions, although the model predicts that 
they will vote “no” on several occasions. Another problem related to the exactness of 
the model is that the model only manage to get 12 of the 32 actual “no” votes (37,5%) 
right. This means that many of the countries actually vote “no”, when they are 
supposed to vote “yes”. Hence the member states do not necessary follow their 
preferences on single-issues when they vote in the Council. This suggests that the 
model may have to be complemented by other explanations in order to give a nuanced 
picture of the voting behaviour of the Council, since the model does not capture the 
essence of voting behaviour in the Council in a valid manner. But it is also valuable to 
have a closer look on the predicted versus actual shares of opposition when we group 
the members into three groups based on their size: 
 
                                                     
16
 Recall and precision percents adjusted up/down to nearby half value. This applies to all recall/precision tables. 
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Figure 5-3 Negative actual and predicted votes per. country group 
 
The five largest countries (Germany, France, UK, Italy and Spain) account for 37,5% 
of the actual “no” votes  (negative statements) and 33% of the predicted no votes. So it 
seems like the model manage to predict the actual share of opposition linked to the 
largest countries in a sufficient manner, even though it does not always manage to 
predict which votes that will turn out to be negative. In relation to this, the analysis 
conducted by Heisenberg (2005:77) shows that this group of countries account for 46 
% of the votes against and 54% of the abstentions, 8,5% and 16,5% more than the 
small sample of this analysis detects. Hence the large countries express less 
disagreement in the 37 proposals of this analysis than in the proposals in general from 
the time period 1994-2002.  
 
In comparison, the five middle-sized countries (the Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, 
Portugal and Sweden) account for 47% of the actual “no” votes and 29,5% of the 
predicted no votes. The model thus underestimate the actual share of opposition 
attached to this group of countries with 17,5%. But the fact that the medium-sized 
countries account for 47% of the actual opposition supports the findings of Hagemann 
(2007:12). Her analysis reveal that after the enlargement (EU 25) the largest member 
states are not longer the ones that record their disagreements most frequently. The role 
that was previously attributed to the largest member states has gradually shifted to the 
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group of medium-sized members. The members of this group (the first of two 
“medium” groups in her analysis) are Netherlands, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, and besides from the latter two member states, the 
group members are also represented in the medium-sized group of this analysis. This 
may suggest that on some policy issues the “negative” role could have shifted from 
large- to medium-sized member states even prior to the enlargement. 
 
 It is also interesting to note that the five smallest countries (Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland and Luxembourg) account for only 15,5 % of the actual no votes and 
37,5% of the predicted “no” votes. This means that the small members vote/act upon 
their preferences in a much lesser degree than the bigger countries, and this may 
suggest that there are some costs relating to voting “no” for these countries. Mattila 
(2004:46) argues that the smaller member states are practical in their orientation and 
that they understand that they cannot win every situation. Hence they will concentrate 
their efforts and record their disagreement only on those decisions that are highly 
important to them. In relation to this, Hagemann (2006) advocates that the Council 
members consider their possibilities for influencing new legislation as defined by their 
voting power (number of votes), and that voting behaviour is the result of strategic 
estimations rather than sincere preferences.  
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5.3.3 The largest Member States 
 
Table 5-2 Germany, France and UK 
Germany: 
                Actual: 
 
Predicted: 
Yes 
 
No Precision 
Yes 22 1 22/23= 
95,5% 
No 13 1 1/14= 
7% 
 
Recall 
22/35= 
63% 
 
1/2= 
50% 
 
France: 
                Actual: 
 
Predicted: 
Yes 
 
No Precision 
Yes 28 1 28/29= 
96,5% 
No 7 1 1/8= 
12,5% 
 
Recall 
28/35= 
80% 
 
1/2= 
50% 
 
 
UK: 
                Actual: 
 
Predicted: 
Yes 
 
No Precision 
Yes 24 1 24/25= 
96% 
No 10 2 2/12= 
16,5% 
 
Recall 
24/34= 
70,5% 
2/3= 
66,5% 
 
 
 
 
 
Generally the precision values, that examine how many of the predicted positive votes 
that are actually positive, are quite consistent within this group. The precision percent 
varies only between 95,5-96,5%. According to the predicted negative votes, Germany 
should be the most negative, UK would take a middle position and France should take 
the least negative position of the three. But as the precision percent of the negative 
predicted and actual votes reveal, Germany is in fact the least negative (in terms of 
acting upon its predicted disagreement), France takes a middle position and UK is the 
most negative. These precision percents also reveal that the model does a poor job 
when trying to predict the extent of the negative votes that these three member states 
actually have taken. The actual negative votes accounts for only 7-16,5 % of the 
negative votes predicted by the model. 
 
When looking at the recall percents the test reveal that the simple spatial model 
manage to predict between 60-80% of the actual positive votes and between 50-66,5 % 
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of the actual negative votes. Once again the model has the poorest performance when 
looking at the largest country of the EU and the biggest contributor to the EU budget, 
Germany. This is an interesting finding, since the previous analyses of this thesis and 
the Council literature in general advocate that the large, northern and richest member 
states are most likely to vote no (Mattila 2006, Zimmer et al. 2005, Hagemann 2007 
and Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006 ). But quite the contrary, Germany does not 
seem to vote upon its preferences in the same way as the literature suggests it would 
do.  
5.3.4 Benelux and Austria 
 
Table 5-3 Benelux and Austria 
Netherlands: 
                Actual: 
 
Predicted: 
Yes 
 
No Precision 
Yes 24 3 24/27= 
89% 
 
No 9 1 1/10= 
10% 
 
Recall 
 
24/33= 
72,5% 
1/4= 
25% 
 
Belgium: 
                Actual: 
 
Predicted: 
Yes 
 
No Precision 
Yes 27 2 27/29= 
93% 
No 7 1 1/8= 
12,5% 
 
Recall 
27/34= 
79,5% 
1/3= 
33,5% 
 
 
Austria: 
                Actual: 
 
Predicted: 
Yes 
 
No Precision 
Yes 25 0 25/25= 
100% 
No 11 1 1/12= 
8,5% 
 
Recall 
 
25/36= 
69,5% 
1/1= 
100% 
 
Luxembourg: 
                Actual: 
 
Predicted: 
Yes 
 
No Precision 
Yes 26 1 26/27= 
96,5% 
No 9 1 1/10= 
10% 
 
Recall 
26/35= 
74% 
1/2= 
50%% 
 
62 
 
  
The Benelux countries and Austria have many similarities when it comes to recall and 
precision values. All four countries have between 24 and 27 predicted positive votes 
that are also actual positive votes, giving a precision value between 89 % and 100% 
when we take into account the predicted positive votes that actually turned out to be 
negative votes. The precision percent for how many predicted positive votes that 
actually are positive is 100 % for Austria, and this member state also have the best 
model performance of the four member states. With precision percents of 100 % 
(positive) and 8,5% (negative) and recall percents of 69,5% (positive) and 100% 
(negative) the simple spatial model does explain some extents of the voting behaviour 
of Austria. But the negative precision percent is also here very low, and this reveals 
that the model have some problems when trying to predict the extent of actual negative 
votes. The same problems can also be attached to the other three countries in this 
group. 
 
Another problem is the negative recall percents of Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Belgium. The model only manages to predict 25-50% of the actual negative votes of 
these member states accurately. Hence the results indicate that the consistency 
between the model and the reality are of limited degree, at least when it comes to 
predicting the negative votes. Both the extent of these votes (how often disagreement 
actually will be expressed) and the accuracy (which votes that actually will turn out to 
be negative in practice) of these votes are not sufficiently determined by the model. 
And because of this the precision percent and the recall percent, that illustrates the fit 
of the positive votes, never manage to reach 100%.  
 
It is though interesting to note that both Belgium and the Netherlands expressed their 
disagreement more frequently than the two largest member states, France and 
Germany, expressed theirs  The Netherlands is in fact the most negative member state 
(together with Portugal: see table 5.4), and this finding is equivalent to the analysis of 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006:282). They emphasis, that the Netherlands are 
among the top 5 countries that are most likely to abstain or to vote “no”, both before 
and after the enlargement. 
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5.3.5 The Cohesion Bloc  
 
Table 5-4 The Cohesion Bloc 
Italy: 
                Actual: 
 
Predicted: 
Yes 
 
No Precision 
Yes 28 2 28/30= 
93,5% 
No 6 1 1/7= 
14,5% 
 
Recall 
28/34= 
82,5% 
1/3= 
33,5% 
 
 
Spain: 
                Actual: 
 
Predicted: 
Yes 
 
No Precision 
Yes 29 2 29/31= 
93,5% 
No 6 0 0/6= 
--- 
 
Recall 
 
29/35= 
93,5% 
0/2= 
--- 
 
Greece: 
                Actual: 
 
Predicted: 
Yes 
 
No Precision 
Yes 29 2 29/31= 
93,5% 
No 5 1 1/6= 
16,5% 
 
Recall 
29/34= 
85,5% 
1/3 
33,5% 
 
 
Portugal: 
                Actual: 
 
Predicted: 
Yes 
 
No Precision 
Yes 27 3 27/30= 
90% 
No 6 1 1/7= 
14,5% 
 
Recall 
27/33= 
80% 
1/4 
25% 
 
 
Ireland: 
                Actual: 
 
Predicted: 
Yes 
 
No Precision 
Yes 28 0 28/28= 
100% 
No 9 0 0/9= 
--- 
 
Recall 
28/37= 
75,5% 
0/0= 
--- 
 
 
 
According to Zimmer et al. (2005) the member states that benefit the most from the 
EU budget should be among the least negative member states since the less prosperous 
Council members benefit from more integration (both more regulation and more 
redistribution) between the member states. But as the results show this assumption is 
not supported adequately by the data employed in this thesis. Only Ireland behaves as 
64 
 
  
predicted by this theory, voting yes on all the 37 proposals. The other four countries 
voted “no” 1-4 times, and Italy (3 negative statements), Greece (3 negative statements) 
and Portugal (4 negative statements) voted “no” more frequently than the average EU 
member state. This finding is also consistent with the findings of Hagemann (2007),  
and Heidenberg (2005) and may suggest that the net-receivers in fact not necessarily 
can be recognised by their explicit voting behaviour in such a way that some of the 
existing Council literature claims. But it has to be said that the disagreement expressed 
by this group not necessarily can be linked to any preferences “of less redistribution 
and regulation”, it may just as likely be a protest against reforms of the agricultural 
sector or some issues relating to other complex conflicts of the EU. Any how a 
detailed discussion of the context of each “no” vote is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
The low degree of opposition showed by Spain (2 negative) and France (table 5.2) 
supports the analysis of Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006:282-285). They find that 
Spain and France voice their opposition rather less frequently than one should expect 
the largest countries to do, and explain this by that: either these governments success 
repeatedly in getting their interests accommodated or their political cultures make 
them prefer to appear at the winning side after the final stage of decision-making. 
 
More generally, the results show that the simple spatial model (again) meets problems 
when trying to predict the extent- and the accuracy of the negative votes. But except 
for Ireland and Spain, the recall percent of the negative votes are between 25 and 
33,5%. This means that for Greece, Portugal and Italy the model manage to predict 
some of the actual “no” votes right. Otherwise, the findings of the previous two groups 
(regarding the flaws of the model) also apply to the cohesion block. 
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5.3.6 The Nordic Bloc 
 
Table 5-5 The Nordic Countries 
Sweden: 
                Actual: 
 
Predicted: 
Yes 
 
No Precision 
Yes 25 1 25/26= 
96% 
No 11 0 0/11= 
--- 
 
Recall 
25/36= 
69,5% 
0/1= 
--- 
 
Denmark: 
                Actual: 
 
Predicted: 
Yes 
 
No Precision 
Yes 24 1 24/25= 
96% 
No 11 1 1/12= 
8,5% 
 
Recall 
24/35= 
68,5% 
1/2= 
50% 
 
 
Finland: 
                Actual: 
 
Predicted: 
Yes 
 
No Precision 
Yes 26 0 26/26= 
100% 
No 11 0 0/11= 
--- 
 
Recall 
26/37= 
72% 
0/0= 
--- 
 
 
 
 
The Nordic group does not seem to oppose the decisions in a frequent manner. 
Denmark voted/stated “no” two times, Sweden did this one time and Finland did not 
record any opposition on any of the 37 proposals examined. For all the three countries 
the model predicted a number of 11 “no” votes. This shows that the Nordic group is 
far more positive of the decisions that are made than their positions suggest they are. It 
is interesting to note though, that the model predicts similar results for all the three 
member states. This can again be interpreted as support for the notion of that similar 
voting behaviour may be the result of similarities in economical and political 
structures as discussed in chapter 4. The geographical location of the countries as well 
as similarities in language and long traditions of cooperation may perhaps also 
contribute to explain the similarities in position-taking and actual voting behaviour 
(Elgström et al. 2001). Another related explanation for the countries low level of 
opposition may be their political strategy. Both Finland and Denmark try to maintain a 
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position as the Council member that the Council has to please in order to make a 
decision successful (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006:287). 
 
The results may also support the notion of socialisation processes within the Council 
and COREPER (Comité des représentants permanents). According to Lewis
17
 (1998a, 
2002, 2003) these processes play an important role in shaping both attitudes and 
behaviour, and this argument can also be illustrated through the voting behaviour of 
Sweden. During its first year of membership, 1995, Sweden voted negatively more 
than 30 times. Because of this Sweden tops the list of negative voting pr. country in 
the time period 1995-1998 (Mattila and Lane 2001:43-44). But after its first year 
Sweden moderated its voting behaviour considerably, and this may suggest that the 
new member states need some time to get to know the EU system. While the results 
confirm that Sweden is no longer among the most negative member states, it could be 
interesting to expand this analysis to the new EU 27, and see whether some of the new 
member states also voice their opposition more frequently during their first year of 
membership. In relation to the case of Sweden it is also to be said that Hayes-Renshaw 
and Wallace (2006:282) stresses that a large proportion of the countries‟ negative 
votes in 1995 can be attributed to the misfit between the Swedish agricultural policy 
and the EU agricultural policy. 
 
Overall, the model has the best fit with the actual voting behaviour of Denmark. 
Unfortunately the model performs quite poorly when it tries to predict the negative 
votes of the two other countries. The model does in fact neither manage to capture the 
extent or the accuracy of the negative votes linked to Sweden and Finland (0 negative 
statements), in any possible way. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
17
 As cited in Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006:318). 
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6 CHAPTER 6: EVALUATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
6.1 Under the Scope: The Model’s Performance 
The performance of the simple spatial model is determined from its assumptions and 
predictions.  This chapter will now evaluate the simple spatial model based on the 
criteria of Morton (1999). She advocates that the empirical evaluation of formal 
models may be organised as follows: 
(1) evaluation of assumptions, (2) evaluation of predictions and (3) evaluation of 
alternative models. This chapter will first evaluate the assumptions and the predictions 
of the model, and then evaluate an alternative to the model outlined here. The last 
section will present some thoughts regarding possible future expansions of the 
analyses of this thesis.  
 
6.2 Evaluations of the Model 
The simple spatial model rests upon some fundamental assumptions that were outlined 
in chapter 2. The actors have (1) exogenous and stable preferences, (2) they have 
complete information regarding each other and (3) the decision-making process is 
modelled in a one-dimensional space. Hence there is not room for any uncertainty. 
These three assumptions may all need to be evaluated against the actual reality of 
decision-making in the Council. 
 
First, it is, as the performance of the model shows, not the case that the Council 
members always have stable and exogenous preferences. In, fact the results of this 
thesis rather reveals that the Council members often do not vote upon their estimated 
negative preferences. Rittberger (2000) and McCarty (2000) stress that some actors 
may be more inpatient than the others and that this may mean that these actors “give 
in” more in negotiations in order to struck a deal on an explicit policy domain, even 
though this means that they do not act upon their initial preference. Further on, the 
time frame attached to the different decision-making processes may facilitate changes 
in the preferences of the actors. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006) exemplifies this 
by examining the Takeover Directive. This directive was a result of 15 years of labour, 
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and during such a long time period it is naturally that shifts in preferences (as well as 
governments) may occur. Even so the DEU data applied in this thesis rests upon 
position estimates that are identified by policy experts after the actual decision 
outcome, or just shortly before the proposals were decided upon. This may suggest 
that the preferences should be estimated at least fairly correct for each member state, 
but they could still vary to some extent because of the actors‟ differences in patience 
as well as being affected by party discipline at both the national and European level. 
The preferences may also be subjected to vote trading, even though the existence of 
this in the Council has yet to be proved. Mattila and Lane (2001:46) point out that an 
incentive for vote trading may arise when the intensities of preferences (the salience) 
may vary between the actors. One actor could vote insincerely on one proposal in 
return for support from other actors on another proposal. Mattila and Lane conclude by 
showing how vote trading may be more likely in the Council than in other multilateral 
settings.   
 
Second, the complete information assumption may also raise some questions. But this 
assumption is perhaps more valid than the preference assumption, since the 15 Council 
members of the EU analysed in this thesis engage in multiple formal and informal 
negotiations in addition to an exhaustive preparatory stage before the proposals reach 
the top of the hierarchy. Mattila and Lane (2001:47) stress that the limited number of 
players and the extensive use of preparatory bodies ensure that member states are well 
aware of both each other‟s policy preferences and the saliency that each member 
attach to particular decisions. Even so the complete info assumption may not hold that 
well for the EU 27. 
 
Third, modelling the process in a one-dimensional space oversimplifies the reality of 
decision-making in the Council. This thesis shows that if we employ a 10 % decision 
rule, the political space attached to the proposals examined here may justify a two-
dimensional space. Rittberger (2000:557-558) advocates that the Council negotiates 
along three different dimensions (integration, ideology and institutional), but that only 
one or two of them will affect the bargaining at the same time. Hagemann (2006) 
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emphasis that negotiations that introduce more than one policy issue may in fact take 
place within one single dimension, but may just as likely fall within the larger left-
right dimension rather than the supranational scenario (more-less integration) that are 
advocated by the standard version. Therefore it may be useful to distinguish between 
multi-issue and multi-dimensional bargaining. So for a more thoroughly test, than the 
one done in this thesis it could be useful to model the political space in more than one 
dimension. Hence it is also important to note that the simple spatial model shuts out all 
“noise” that may be attached to the processes; it does not consider other players than 
the 15 Council members. The EP, the Commission, lobbyists, the media and the 
situation in the home countries are not accounted for by the assumptions of the model.  
 
Regarding the predictions it is likely that these may be flawed because of the problems 
outlined when evaluating the model‟s assumptions. More generally mistakes can be 
done in the data and the data treatment that are the fundament for accurate predictions. 
The judgements of the experts in the DEU data may include some misjudgements or 
biases, the interviewers may have biased the data to some extent and the analyses 
presented in this thesis rests upon some discussable judgements.  Also the predictions 
do not allow for any uncertainty, and may hence not manage to capture all the aspects 
of the complex reality. By allowing the Council members to make deviations in their 
behaviour from the logic of the spatial model, as advocated by Hagemann and 
Høyland (2008:13), the predictions of the model may get more accurate (and hence 
closer to the reality).  But even so a simple spatial model, like the one employed here, 
may gain valuable knowledge of an isolated phenomenon, in this setting the voting 
behaviour of the Council. 
 
6.3 Alternative Explanations 
According to Rebecca Morton (1999:101) an empirical evaluation is not complete 
without an evaluation of alternative models. Such evaluations are also advocated by 
Cardie and Wilkerson (2008:3). They stress that the model‟s performance should 
always be compared to one or more baseline systems, and suggest that this may be a 
system that always guesses the most frequent category. In the case of the formal model 
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of this thesis, this will be the “yes” vote category. How does the simple spatial model 
perform in comparison to a “yes”-model? If we have a look at the simple spatial 
model‟s aggregative performance (table 5.1) it is clear that a competing model that 
only predicts positive votes will predict the wrong outcome 32 of 555 times (just 
5,8%). This may suggest that the alternative model will perform better than the model 
tested in this thesis, and hence explain the voting behaviour in the Council in a more 
valid manner. But this is not a clear cut-picture. The recall- and precision percents (of 
the alternative model) that illustrate the exactness/completeness of the negative votes 
will both be undetected (--), and a “yes”-model will hence perform even more poorly 
than the preference-based model of this thesis. When exploring the voting behaviour 
of the Council the negative votes and negative statements are just as important, if not 
even more important, than the positive outcomes. This because opposition in general is 
quite rare, making it interesting to explore the reasons and mechanisms behind the 
negative statements, and in order to do so opposition has to be detected by the formal 
model. 
 
Arguments that support the explanatory force of the “yes” model have often been 
raised in the Council literature, and the Council is often attributed a so-called “Culture 
of Consensus” suggesting that decisions are rarely contested at the final stage of 
decision-making. Heisenberg (2005:81) points out that consensus facilitates 
bargaining, keeps the typically “nationalistic” issues out of the public mind (at least in 
many circumstances), encourages compliance, compensates losers and avoids the 
tyranny of the large states as well as the overweighting of small countries‟ interests. 
The history of accommodating special problems of the member states, as illustrated by 
the “Luxembourg compromise”, may be a part of a rather functional working method 
that facilitates consensus as the prevailing method of decision-making. But focus on 
such a norm may camouflage the actual level of conflicts and contestation in the 
Council. There are a variety of reasons for the seemingly consensual voting outcomes 
of the Council. Among one of them is the role of the Commission. The Commission 
exercises some sort of self-censorship by not sending proposals to the Council that are 
likely not to be accepted at all or that are highly controversial (Heisenberg 2005:71). 
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Table 5.6. summarises some of the factors that may explain the low level of 
contestation at the final stage of decision-making: 
 
Table 6-1 A summary: What may have contributed to create the consensual bias in the 
Council?
18
 
 
Explanations How?/some examples 
The history The Luxembourg compromise, the Ionannina compromise, emergency brakes. 
Time frame attached to 
negotiations 
The Takeover Directive: 15 years of labour before reaching the voting records. 
(Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006). 
Incomplete voting 
records 
A downward bias: disagreement voiced at the preparatory stages + lack of data on 
failed proposals. Governments show opposition only in cases that are of high 
salience to them (Mattila 2004). 
Accommodations of 
special needs  
Achieved to declarations in the Council Minutes and often attached to decisions that 
are taken by consensus. Examples: Exceptions, differentiated rules, longer or 
shorter time delays or transitions (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006).  
Vote trading May be likely in the EU because the possibility of multiple games facilitating trust 
and issue-linkages (Mattila and Lane 2001). 
Formal statements A form of voicing opposition without impeding the traditional consensus, show 
some sort of “national pride”. This thesis includes formal statements in the analyses. 
Voting rules The rules do matter, the consensus affected by the rules applied. 
5/7 of the Council has to agree on a proposal (under QMV) in order for it to reach 
the voting records, even so extended use of QMV may “shake” the consensual mode 
of decision-making. 
Decision-making 
procedures 
The more reliance on Co-decision (II), the more united the Council has to be in 
order to “win” over the EP (Hix 2005). 
Organisational structure 
within the Council 
Prestige to settle agreements before the ministerial level, COREPER and the 
working parties oiling the machinery and facilitate consensus (Hayes-Renshaw and 
Wallace 2006) 
 
If we evaluate the simple spatial model against the consensus norm (that can be 
illustrated as a “yes”-model) and interpret the consensus norm as an alternative 
hypothesis from nonformal theorizing (as advocated by Morton (1999:275), it seems 
like the consensus norm ignores effects that, when incorporated, can lead to different 
predictions. The summary of some of the factors that may contribute to uphold the 
consensual bias in the Council may in fact disguise the real level of contestation in the 
                                                     
18
 This table is partly taken from Wøien Hansen (2008). 
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Council. Hence a model, that only explains the positive votes, lacks the ability to give 
a nuanced picture of the voting behaviour of each Council member and the decision-
making processes of the Council in general. But it is also to be said that the consensual 
bias of the Council may justify some of the difficulties the simple spatial model 
experiences when it tries to predict the extent- and accuracy of the negative statements. 
Thomson and Stokman (2003:20) emphasis that there is a clear distinction between 
actors‟ most favoured policy alternatives and the policy alternatives that they were 
willing to accept or eventually accepted in the form of the decision outcome. The 
results of this thesis may suggest that the compromise mentality, in many cases, may 
be stronger than the individual preferences of each Council member. 
 
The preference for consensus and the fact that the Council goes to great lengths to 
accommodate each member state in the decision outcomes may together with the 
simple spatial model illustrate the voting behaviour of the Council in a more 
comprehensive and valid way. By combining the model and the consensus norm as 
well as its underlying effects for decision-making, it is possible both to explain and 
predict the negative votes/statements and to explain the low level of opposition within 
the Council.  In relation to this, Schneider et al. (2006:304) emphasis that the so called 
bargaining perspective is more successful in predicting outcomes than other models 
considered in Thomson et al. (2006). They advocate that the reason for this is that 
unanimity is a strong norm in EU legislation, even when the legislation processes are 
subjected to QMV voting. Bargaining theory suggests that positions should be taken as 
strategic choices rather than raw preferences, and thus manages to incorporate the 
consensual mode of decision-making into its modelling. Such models may hence 
explain voting behaviour in the Council better than the model presented in this thesis.  
 
6.4 Possible Expansions of this Thesis 
In order to evaluate the performance of the simple spatial model as adequately as 
possible the next step may be to control for the salience attached to the different issues 
of each proposal of the DEU data set. The DEU project asked the policy experts to 
estimate the level of salience or importance each of the actors attached to each of the 
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issues on a scale from 0 to 100 where 100 indicates that an issue is of the highest 
importance to an actor (Thomson and Stokman 2003:22-23). It may be the case that on 
some of the proposals included in the DEU data set the mean of the issues of each 
proposal may not be the Council members‟ accurate position. This because the means 
do not incorporate the level of salience attached to each issue. It could be that one 
actor was very positive towards 2 out of 3 issues, but the third issue was decisive for 
its voting behaviour because this issue was the most important to the actor. Hence it 
could be useful to include the salience variable in further studies on this topic. But as 
Thomson and Stokman (2003:23) emphasise it is intuitively plausible that actors who 
take more extreme positions on an issue also attach higher salience to them. They also 
stress that there is a modest positive correlation between the extremity of the Council 
members‟ positions and the levels of importance they attach to the issues. Because of 
this, it is possible (or likely) that the inclusion of a salience variable would not alter the 
results of this thesis significantly.  
 
Further research may also include differentiation between negative votes and formal 
statements in order to see how many of each kind the simple spatial model manage to 
detect. But as advocated in chapter 2, the inclusion of formal statements give a more 
nuanced picture of the actual level of contestation at the final stage of decision-
making. It could also be interesting to explore whether a change of parties in the 
member states‟ governments may explain some of the cases where the Council 
members were supposed to vote “no” but in fact voted “yes” and vice versa. 
Hagemann and Høyland (2008) show, that when a government is replaced, the new 
government tends to find other coalition partners than the ones favoured by their 
predecessor. This means that a shift in preference may be a result of a shift in 
government. Regarding the 37 proposals that make up the fundament for the testing of 
the simple spatial model only three shifts in government occurred: Italy, Austria and 
Denmark underwent a change in parties in government.
19
 Hence such shifts do not 
influence this thesis that much, but if it was possible to detect the voting data on the 
missing 26 proposals as well it could be very useful to control for change in parties in 
                                                     
19
 This finding was revealed when making the actual voting data set ready for the analyses of this thesis. 
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government. When that is said it could be that the simple spatial model could perform 
somewhat better in relation to Italy, Austria and Denmark if this analysis takes into 
account the shift in government in these three countries.  
 
Another possible extension of this thesis could be, as previously mentioned, to relax 
some of the assumptions of the simple spatial model.  Either by employing a multi-
dimensional model, allow the Council members to deviate more in their behaviour, 
relax the accuracy of the indifferent point (IP in figure 5.2), take into account the 
differences in voting power or incorporate the lessons learnt from the bargaining 
perspective. Another idea would be to estimate the costs of voting ”no”. The results in 
chapter 5 suggest that these costs are higher for the smaller countries than for the 
larger countries, and based on these results it could be possible to estimate the costs for 
each group of countries. If the cost of voting “no” is higher than the cost of voting 
“yes” the countries would rather chose not to have their opposition recorded than to 
vote sincerely at the final stage of the decision-making process
20
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
20
 This could again be illustrated by employing “position minus indifferent point” as a measure for the cost of 
voting “no”. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The thesis has argued that positions on single-issues explain only a proportion of the 
actual voting behaviour in the Council of Ministers. The test of the simple spatial 
model revealed that the model managed to predict a large amount of the actual “yes”-
votes right, but it did not manage to predict the extent and the accuracy of the negative 
statements that well.  Even so, some percent of the negative positions recorded by the 
DEU-project did translate into negative statements in the voting data. The model 
managed thus to detect some of the disagreement shown by each Council member 
(except from Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Spain) at the final stage of decision-
making.  This means that the simple spatial model employed in the thesis may perform 
better than a “yes” model, as discussed in chapter 6, if the criteria are to detect both 
positive- and negative votes (statements). 
 
The test of the simple spatial model also supported some of the findings from the 
analyses of the different data constellations and some of the main findings in the 
literature. The two voting data CA plots in chapter 4 did show a weak tendency of a 
big versus small countries cleavage, a finding advocated by Heisenberg (2005), 
Mattila and Lane (2001) and Mattila (2004). The test of the model revealed that the 
large member states did record their opposition more frequently than their smaller 
counterparts, and also that the proportion of the negative positions attached to the five 
largest members was quite similar to the group‟s proportion of negative statements. 
Even so, the test of the model showed that the medium-sized group of member states 
voiced their opposition more frequently than the other two groups in question. This 
finding is consistent with the findings advocated by Hagemann (2007). But, as 
advocated by Heisenberg and Mattila and Lane the smaller countries show their 
disagreement much less often than the medium-sized- and the largest countries. In fact, 
the model overestimates the opposition level attached to the smallest Council 
members, and this may suggest that there are costs related to voting “no” for this 
particular country group and/or that these countries do not think their votes matter for 
the final outcome of these decisions.  
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The plots (CA, PC, MDS and HC) in chapter 3 and the “DEU ” CA plots in chapter 4 
drew a clear southern European bloc, suggesting that support for the north-south 
dimension could be detected. The north-south dimension has received a lot of attention 
in the literature, and Zimmer et al (2005) advocate that this dimension may be 
incorporated in a more general redistributive dimension. The interpretation of this 
dimension is that the voting behaviour of the net-contributors to the EU budget differs 
from the voting behaviour of the net-receivers.  Such a dimension may also rest upon 
the mentioned arguments from political economy. The redistributive dimension may 
reveal itself by the southern European member states‟ reluctance to show their 
opposition towards the EU decisions because of the benefits they receive from the EU 
budget. But the test of the model showed that member states like Italy, Greece and 
Portugal in the Cohesion bloc, in fact was among the most negative members of the 
Council along with the Netherlands and the UK.  So the south European member states 
may represent a bloc, but this bloc is, according to this thesis, not characterised by the 
countries reluctance to voice their opposition openly. Hence, based on the small 
sample of overlapping proposals, the net-payers are not more likely to dissent than the 
net-receivers. Table 7.1 summarises the findings of this thesis and relates the findings 
directly to the studies discussed throughout the thesis: 
 
Table 7-1 The Findings of this Thesis versus the Findings of the Council Literature 
 
 
Author Type of data Main findings: conflict structure Method This thesis 
Mattila and 
Lane 
(2001) 
Council Minutes 
1381 pieces of 
legislation from 
1994-1998 
Large countries are significantly 
more inclined to vote “no” than 
their smaller counterparts. Finds 
support for the north-south 
dimension.Search for unanimity, 
consensus building.  
Roll-call 
analysis 
Multidime
nsional 
scaling 
Some of the large countries do vote 
together according to the voting 
data CAs, but the test of model 
reveals that the middle-sized 
countries actually vote “no” more 
frequently.  
Mattila 
(2004) 
Council  
Minutes 
180 observations 
from 1995-2000: 
voting records for 
15 member states 
for 12 half years 
periods 
Results support that the political 
space is defined by two 
dimensions: left-right and 
independence versus integration 
dimension. Pro-integration and left-
wing governments as well as 
smaller countries vote “no” less 
frequently than their counterparts. 
Roll-call 
analysis 
Bivariate 
and 
regression 
The “all positions” CA plot 
supports the existence of these two 
dimensions, the other three CA 
plots does not fit that well with 
Mattila‟s results. But the thesis 
does not take into account shifts in 
governments. If it had done that in 
all the analyses presented the 
findings in relation to these 
dimensions could be easier to 
interpret. 
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Zimmer, 
Schneider, 
Dobbins 
(2005) 
Expert interviews 
(DEU data- 
Thomson et al. 
70 Commission 
proposals: 162 
issues on decrees, 
directives and 
decisions under 
Consultation and 
Co-decision 
Results support that a redistribution 
dimension shapes the political 
space. The north-south dimension 
is a sub-dimension of the 
redistribution-dimension as goes 
along the line of the conflict 
between the net-distributors (north) 
and the net-receivers (south and 
east). 
Correspon
dence 
analysis 
The four position data plots (CA, 
MDS, HC and PC) and to some 
extent the DEU 44 positions CA 
plot support the north-south 
dimension, which again supports 
the redistribution-dimension. But 
the cohesion bloc are not more 
inclined to vote yes than others, in 
fact Greece, Italy and Portugal are 
among the most negative. 
Heisenberg 
(2005) 
Council Minutes 
Recorded 
legislation from 
1994-2002 
Size do matter, the five largest 
countries account for 46 % of the 
votes against. Finds no support for 
the redistributive dimension. 
Informal norm of consensus 
prevails. 
Roll-call  
analysis 
In this thesis‟s small sample the 
five biggest countries account for 
37,5% of the negative statements, 
suggesting that size do not 
necessarily matter that much. 
Hayes-
Renshaw 
and 
Wallace 
(2006) 
Council Minutes 
Recorded 
legislation 1994-
2004 
No evidence of traditional left/right 
cleavages. The north-south 
dimension as a redistribution 
dimension. 
Expert 
interview, 
document 
analysis 
The “all positions”  plots (CA, PC, 
HC and MDS) support the north-
south dimension. Little evidence of 
left/right cleavages, but the thesis 
do not control for shifts in 
governments.  
Mattila 
(2006) 
Council Minutes 
805 legislative acts 
from May 2004 to 
April 2006 
Clear existence of a north-south 
dimension even after enlargement. 
This can be interpreted as free 
market based solutions versus 
regulatory solutions. Slightly 
increased consensus 
Roll-call 
analysis 
NOMINA
TE 
This thesis has not analysed data 
from this time period, but it 
supports Mattila‟s main argument 
Hagemann 
(2007, 
2006) 
Council Minutes 
and 57 expert 
interviews 
January 1999 to 
December 2006 
period. 872 pieces 
of legislation. 
After the enlargement the medium-
sized members are the ones that 
vote “no“ most frequently, rather 
than the largest members. Still 
some conflict structure of 
geographical location, but no 
distinct pattern. 
Governments act strategically 
rather than sincerely when deciding 
how to best pursue their policy 
preferences. 
Roll-call 
analysis 
NOMINA
TE: 
(geometri
cal scaling 
method) 
Even before the enlargement it is 
some suggestions that the medium-
sized member states vote “no” the 
most frequently. Also this thesis‟ 
results show to some extent that 
the Council members may vote 
more strategically than sincerely.   
Hagemann 
and 
Høyland 
(2008)  
Council Minutes 
Jan. 1999 to Dec. 
2006 period. 872 
pieces of 
legislation. 
Ideological affiliations influence 
coalition formation in the Council. 
Coalition patterns change when 
governments are replaced.  
Ideal point 
estimation 
technique 
This argument may explain some 
of the wrong predictions of the 
simple spatial model 
 
But as chapter 6 advocated, the performance of the simple spatial model may be a lot 
better if we for instance relax some of the assumptions of the model or incorporate 
lessons learnt from the bargaining perspective. Since positions on single-issues only 
explain a proportion of the voting behaviour in the Council of Ministers it could be 
suggested that the Council members vote more strategically than sincerely. A possible 
expansion of the thesis is hence to control for shifts in the member states‟ 
governments, each member states‟ voting power and the saliency they attach to each 
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issue and then employ a similar research design with a preferably larger sample of 
overlapping proposals (positions and votes).  However, since the matching of positions 
and voting data, as done by this thesis, has not been presented in this way before, 
further research is needed in order to give the arguments presented here a more general 
“stamp of approval”.  It would be interesting to further explore these findings in the 
future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Bartholomew, D. J., F. Steele, I. Moustaki and J. I. Galbraith (2002). The Analysis and 
Interpretation of Multivariate Data for Social Scientists. New York: Chapman and 
Hall/CRC. 
 
Bogomolnaia, A. and J. Laslier (2007). “Euclidean preferences”, Journal of 
Mathematical Economics 43: 87-98. (2008, November 25) [online]. - URL: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VBY-4M5WJ53-
1&_user=674998&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C00003
6598&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=674998&md5=d8a5fb90eb1dc62984822
d9307675429 
 
Boyer, R. (1997). “French Statism at the Crossroads”, p. 71-101 in C. Crouch and W. 
Streeck (ed.): Political Economy of Modern Capitalism. London: Sage. 
 
Cardie, C. and J. Wilkerson (2008). “Guest Editors' Introduction: 
Text Annotation for Political Science Research”, Journal of Information Technology 
& Politics 5:1-6. 
 
Christophersen, K. (2006). Databehandling og statistisk analyse med SPSS. Oslo: 
Unipub. 
 
Crombez, C. (1996). “Legislative Procedures in the European Community”, British 
Journal of Political Science 26 (1):199-218. 
 
Elgström, O., B. Bjurulf, J. Johansson and A. Sannerstedt (2001). “Coalitions in 
European Union Negotiations”, Scandinavian Political Studies 24:111-28. 
 
Fox, J. (2002). An R and S-Plus Companion to Applied Regression. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage. 
80 
 
  
 
Haas, E. B. (1958). The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 
1950-57. London: Stevens and Sons. 
 
Hagemann, S. (2007). “Voting and formal statements: How governments record their 
positions in the enlarged EU”. Brussels: European Policy Centre. Paper. 
 
Hagemann, S. (2006). Decision-Making in the European Union’s Council of Ministers. 
London: London School of Economics and Political Science. PhD thesis. 
 
Hagemann, S. and B. Høyland (2008). ”Parties in the Council”, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 2008, 15 (8): 1205-1221. 
 
Hall, P. A. (1999). ”The Political Economy in Europe in an Era of Interdependence”, 
p. 135-163 in  H. Kitschelt et al. (ed.): Continuity and Change in Contemporary 
Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hayes-Renshaw, F. and H. Wallace (2006). The Council of Ministers. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Heisenberg, D. (2005). “The Institution of „Consensus‟ in the European Union: Formal 
versus Informal decision-making in the Council”, European Journal of Political 
Research 44: 65-90. 
 
Hix, S. (2005). The Political System of the European Union. London: Palgrave. 
 
Hoffman, S. (1966). “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case 
of the Western Europe”, Daedalus 95(4): 862-915. 
 
Lindberg, L. N (1963). The Political Dynamics of Economic Integration. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
81 
 
 
 
 
Mattila, M. and J. Lane (2001). “Why Unanimity in the Council?: A Roll Call 
Analysis of Council Voting”, European Union Politics 2: 31-52. 
 
Mattila, M. (2004). “Contested decisions: Empirical analysis of voting in the European 
Union Council of Ministers”, European Journal of Political Research 43: 29-50.  
 
Mattila, M. (2006). “Voting and Coalitions in the Council- Two Years after the 
Enlargement”, in D. Naurin and H. Wallace (ed.): Who Governs in the Council of 
Ministers? Presented at a European University Institute Workshop. Florence, 19-20 
May. Conference paper.  
 
McCarty, N. (2000) “Proposal Rights, Veto Rights, and Political Bargaining”, 
American Journal of Political Science 44(3): 506-22. 
 
Milyo, J. (2000). “A Problem with Euclidean preferences in spatial models of 
politics”, Economic Letters 66: 179-182.  (2008, November 24) [online]. - URL: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6V84-3Y3PRG2-
9&_user=674998&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C00003
6598&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=674998&md5=b7f78e589c5a0fcf5dcc33
e9fd53d51b 
 
Moravcsik, A. (1998). The Choice of Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht. London: UCL Press. 
 
Morton, R. (1999). Methods & Models: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal 
Models in Political Science.  Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
 
Moser, P. (1996). “The European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: What are 
the Conditions? A Critique of Tsebelis (1994)”, American Political Science Review 90 
(4):834-8. 
 
82 
 
  
Pierson, P. (1996). “The Path to European Integration. A Historical Institutionalist 
Analysis”, Comparative Political Studies 29 (2): 123-163. 
 
Rittberger, B. (2000). “Impatient Legislators and New Issue-Dimensions: A Critique 
of the Garrett – Tsebelis „standard version‟ of Legislative Politics”, Journal of 
European Public Policy 7 (4): 554-75. 
 
Schneider, G., B. Steunenberg and M. Widgrén (2006) “Evidence with insight: what 
models contribute to EU research”, p. 299-316 in R. Thomson et al. (ed): The 
European Union Decides. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Scully, R. (1997). “The EP and the Co-Decision Procedure: A Reassessment”, Journal 
of Legislative Studies 3 (3):93-103. 
Skog, O. (2004). Å forklare sosiale fenomener: En regresjonsbasert tilnærming. Oslo: 
Gyldendal. 
 
Steunenberg, B. (1994) “Decision-making under different institutional arrangements: 
Legislation by the European Community”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics 150: 642-69 
 
Sverdrup, U. (2004): “Compliance and Conflict Management in the European Union: 
Nordic Exceptionalism”, Scandinavian Political Studies 27: 23-43. 
 
Thomson, R. and F. N. Stokman (2003). “Decision making in the European Union”. 
Groningen: ICS Occasional Papers and Documents Series. Codebook.  
 
Thomson, R., F. N. Stokman, C. H. Achen and T. König (ed.) (2006). The European 
Union Decides. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tsebelis, G. and G. Garrett (1996). “An Institutional Critique of 
Intergovernmentalism”, International Organization 50 (2): 269-99. 
83 
 
 
 
 
 
Tsebelis, G and G. Garrett (2000). “Legislative Politics in the European Union”, 
European Union Politics 1 (1): 9-36. 
 
Wøien Hansen, V. (2007). Fra samarbeid til medbestemmelse: 
Vant Europaparlamentet i Maastricht?. STV 4228B. Oslo: University of Oslo, 
Department of Political Science. Course thesis. 
 
Wøien Hansen, V. (2008). Why is there such a high degree of consensus in the Council 
of Ministers?. STV 4445B. Oslo: University of Oslo, Department of Political Science. 
Course thesis. 
 
Zimmer, C., G. Schneider and M. Dobbins (2005). “The Contested Council: Conflict 
Dimensions of an Intergovernmental EU Institution”, Political Studies 53: 403-422. 
 
 
Datasets: 
Hagemann, Sara (1999-d.d). All legislation passed in the Council from January 1999 
until now. 
 
Thomson, Robert and Frans N. Stokman (1999-2002). “Decision making in the 
European Union”. 
 
URLs: 
EurActiv (2008, November 12) [online]. - URL: 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/general/agreement-reached-new-tobacco-directive/article-
116403 
 
Council Minutes (2008, November 22) [online]. - URL: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=552&lang=EN&mode=g 
 
 
84 
 
  
APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Data Preparation: 
 
1) Issues that have been removed from the analysis of the DEU data set: 
 
1. d00062i1    had 6 missing    
2. d00062i2    had 10 missing 
3. d95341i3    had 8 missing 
4. n00358i3    had 8 missing  
5. n00358i5    had 8 missing  
6. d98325i2    had 6 missing 
7. n96115i2    had 10 missing 
8. n98087i1    had 11 missing 
9. n98189i2    had 14 missing 
10. n99092i2  had 9 missing 
11. n99116i1  had 6 missing 
12. n99225i2  had 9 missing 
13. n99236i2  had 9 missing 
14. n99255i2 had 13 missing 
15. n98193i3 had 9 missing 
Before 174 issues. Now 159 issues. 
 
 
2) Finding convergence between the references of the Commission proposals in DEU data and 
the references of the Commission proposals in voting data (Hagemann) by using a third 
information dataset of raw data with both dates and proposal texts (conducted by Hagemann) 
 
Criterions and assumptions:  
 Overlapping proposal texts and/or dates of Council Meeting 
 Usually the proposals of the same Council meeting/Council minutes in the voting data 
have the same order and rankings as the Council minutes in general: 
I.e.: CNS/1998/347, COM(1998)728: “Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 of 17 
December 1999 laying down the detailed rules and arrangements regarding Community 
structural assistance in the fisheries sector” is item 3 and ranking no. 5 in the 14172/99 
Council Minutes. Hence it also has ranking no. 5 of the 14172/99 proposals in the voting data 
set. This has been double-checked and the exceptions have been accommodated. 
 All the Council Minutes of 1999-2002 have been examined in order to double-check 
that rankings and info are correct and to source for any additional information. I could 
not find any thing that was not included in the information data set. 
 The number in brackets related to the policy area, is the number the proposal is given 
in the figure (see Appendix B) that summarises both data sets. 
 
Table 2A: Identifying the Proposals  
 
Policy area Ref 
DEU data* 
Ref 
Voting data (Inter-
institutional reference 
number) 
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1. Fisheries/eco/fin CNS/1996/160 
COM(1996)296 
- 
2. Fisheries 
(4) 
CNS/1998/347 
COM(1998)728 
n98347 
2 issues 
14172/99 ranking: 5 (item 
3) 
3. Fisheries 
(5) 
CNS/1999/047 
COM(1999)055 
n99047 
3 issues 
14172/99 
Ranking: 4. (item 2 ) 
4. Fisheries 
(environment) 
(6) 
CNS/1999/050 
COM(1999)070 
n99050 
1 issue 
9433/99 
Ranking:1 
(item 1) 
5. Fisheries 
(7) 
CNS/1999/138 
COM(1999)345 
n99138 
2 issues 
14172/99 
B Item! Ranking: 22 
(Item 5) 
6. Fisheries 
(8) 
CNS/1999/163 
COM(1999)382 
n99163 
2 issues 
7374/00 
Ranking: 4 
(Item 17) 
7. Fisheries 
(9) 
CNS/1999/255 
COM(1999)636 
n99255 
1 issue 
9234/00  
Ranking:1 
(item 2)  
8. Ecofin/General affairs 
(10) 
CNS/1998/189 
COM(1998)320 
n98189 
1 issue 
10197/99 
Ranking: 1. (item 5) 
9. Ecofin/fisheries 
(11) 
COD/1998/252 
COM(1998)461 
n98252 
2 issues 
9407/00 Ranking: 2 (item 
12) 
10. Ecofin 
(12) 
CNS/1998/331 
COM(1998)693 
n98331 
2 issues 
8589/99 
Ranking 1. item 1 
11. Ecofin 
(13) 
CNS/1999/056 
COM(1999)062 
n99056 
1 issue 
12142/99 
Ranking: 1 (item 17) 
12. Ecofin 
(14) 
CNS/1999/151 
COM(1999)364 
n99151 
1 issue 
11656/00 
Ranking: 1 (item 18) 
13. Ecofin 
(15) 
CNS/2000/223 
COM(2000)537 
n00223 
2 issues 
5537/01 
Ranking: 1 (item 2) 
14. JHA 
 
CNS/1999/116 
COM(1999)260 
- 
15. JHA CNS/1999/154 
COM(1999)348 
- 
16. JHA 
(16) 
CNS/1999/274 
COM(1999)686 
n99274 
3 issues 
11657/00 
Ranking: 2 (item 10) 
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17. JHA 
(17) 
CNS/2000/030 
COM(2000)027 
n00030 
6 issues 
7181/01 
Ranking: 1 (item 1) 
18. JHA social 
(18) 
CNS/2000/127 
COM(2000)303 
n00127 
3 issues 
11181/01 
Ranking: 1 (item 7) 
19. GA CNS/1998/299 
COM(1998)600/1 
- 
20. GA COD/1998/300 
COM(1998)600/2 
- 
21. GA 
Civil protection 
(19) 
CNS/1998/354 
COM(1998)768 
n98354 
2 issues 
13859/99 
Ranking: 1 (item 4) 
22. GA CNS/1999/132 
COM(1999)312 
 
23. GA CNS/1999/214 
COM(1999)494 
 
24. GA 
(20) 
COD/2000/032 
COM(2000)030 
d00032 
4 issues 
9204/01 
Ranking: 2 (item 6) 
25. Culture/fisheries 
(21) 
CNS/1999/066 
COM(1999)111 
n99066 
1 issue 
13168/99 
Ranking: 1 (item 7) 
26. Culture 
Agriculture/fisheries 
education 
COD/1999/275 
COM(1999)658/1 
 
27. Culture/labour/social 
(22) 
CNS 1999/276 
COM(1999)658/2 
n99276 
5 issues 
14774/00 
Ranking: 2 (item 3) 
28. Development COD/2000/062 
COM(2000)111/1 
- 
29. Development/agriculture 
(23) 
CNS/2000/062B 
COM(2000)111/2 
n0062B 
1 issue 
11182/01 
Ranking: 6 (item 14)  
30. Employment 
(24) 
CNS/1999/192 
COM(1999)440 
n99192 
2 issues 
5593/00 
Nr. 4 (item 8) 
31. Employment 
(25) 
CNS/1999/225 
COM(1999)565 
n99225 
1 issue 
13875/00 
Ranking: 2 (item 2) 
32. Energy COD/1999/127 
COM(1999)296 
- 
33. Health 
Industry/energy diff dates 
(26) 
 
COD/1999/244 
COM(1999)594 
d99244 
5 issues 
8763/01 
Ranking: 3 (item 6) 
 
34. Industry CNS/1998/288 
COM(1998)546 
- 
35. Social Affairs  COD/1998/195 
COM(1998)329 
- 
87 
 
 
 
 
36.Transport COD/1999/083 
COM(1999)158 
- 
37. Transport COD/1999/252 
COM(1999)617 
- 
38. Transport COD/2000/060 
COM(2000)137 
- 
39. Transport COD/2000/067 
COM(2000)142 
- 
40. Internal market COD/1995/341 
COM(1995)655 
- 
41. Internal market COD/1996/085 
COM(1996)097 
- 
42. Internal market 
(27) 
COD/1996/112 
COM(1995)722/1 
d96112 
4 issues 
8991/00 
Ranking: 1 (item 3) 
43. Internal market 
(28) 
CNS/1996/114 
COM(1995)722/3 
n96114 
3 issues 
15451/01 
Ranking: 3 (item 1) 
44. Internal market 
(29) 
CNS/1996/115 
COM(1995)722/4 
n96115 
1 issue 
15451/01 
Ranking: 5 (item 3) 
45. Internal market 
Consumers 
(3) 
COD/1996/161 
COM(1995)520 
d96161 
2 issues 
8319/99 
Ranking: 12 (item 8) 
46. Internal market 
Transport/telecom 
(30) 
COD/1997/264 
COM(1997)510 
d97264 
1 issue 
8113/00 
Ranking: 4 (item 10) 
47. Internal market 
Gen aff/culture 
(31) 
COD/1997/359 
COM(1997)628 
d97359 
3 issues 
7906/01 
Ranking: 1 (item 23) 
48. Internal market COD/1998/134 
COM(1998)226 
- 
49. Internal market COD/1998/191 
COM(1998)297 
- 
50. Internal market COD/1998/240 
COM(1998)450 
- 
51. Internal market COD/1998/325 
COM(1998)586 
- 
52. Internal market 
(32) 
COD/1999/158 
COM(1999)329 
d99158 
1 issue 
5537/01 
Ranking: 3 (item 26) 
53. Agriculture 
(33) 
CNS/1998/092 
COM(1998)135 
n98092 
6 issues 
10196/99 
Ranking: 12 ( item 3) 
54. Agriculture 
(1) 
CNS/1998/109 
COM(1998)158/3 
n98109 
2 issues 
8319/99 
Ranking:4 
(Item 1 d) 
 
55. Agriculture 
(2) 
CNS/1998/110 
COM(1998)158/4 
n98110 
8319/99 
Ranking:5 
(Item 1 e) 
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2 issues 
56. Agriculture COD/1998/323 
COM(1998)623 
- 
57. Agriculture 
(41) 
CNS/1999/072 
COM(1999)130 
n99072 
3 issues 
9221/99 
Ranking:2 
(item 8) 
B item! 
58. Agriculture CNS/1999/202 
COM(1999)188 
- 
59. Agriculture* 
(34) 
CNS/1999/202 
COM(1999)492 
n99202 
2 issues 
9066/01 
Ranking:3 (item 3)  
60. Agriculture 
(35) 
COD/1999/204 
COM(1999)487 
d99204 
4 issues 
10454/00 
Ranking:6 
(item 7) B-item!  
61. Agriculture 
(36) 
COD/1999/217 
COM(1999)456 
d99217 
1 issue 
7949/00 
Ranking: 1 (Item 1) 
62. Agriculture 
(37) 
CNS/1999/235 
COM(1999)582 
n99235 
2 issues 
5702/01 
Ranking: 1 (item 1) 
63. Agriculture CNS/1999/236 
COM(1999)576 
- 
64. Agriculture/Budget 
(38) 
CNS/1999/246 
COM(1999)608 
n99246 
2 issues 
10455/00 
Ranking: 3 (item 35) 
65. Agriculture 
(39) 
CNS/2000/250 
COM(2000)604 
n00250 
3 issues 
10182/01 Ranking:1 (item 
1) 
66. Agriculture 
(40) 
CNS/2000/358 
COM(2000)855 
n00358 
3 issues 
11182/01 
Ranking:2 (item 2) 
67. Internal market COD/1999/238 
COM(1999)577 
- 
68. ECOFIN 
(42) 
CNS/1998/087 
COM(1998)067 
n98087 
1 issue  
10173/03 Ranking:3 (item 
8b) B-item 
69. ECOFIN 
(43) 
CNS/1998/193 
COM(1998)295 
n98193 
2 issues 
10173/03 
Ranking:2 (item 8a) 
B-item 
70. Telecom 
(44) 
COD/2000/184 
COM(2000)393 
d00184 
3 issues 
6264/02 
Ranking:2 
(item 6a) 
 
26 missing 
44 proposals ok 
 
5 B-items  
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*Ref Thomson: 
n= consultation procedure 
d= Co-decision procedure 
number of issues= number of issues AFTER ruled out the issues with more than four missing 
values  
 
3)  
Table 3A: Proposal titles, references and numbers of initial issues (source: Thomson and 
Stokman 2003) 
 
Agriculture (14 Commission proposals, 40 issues) 
Reference Name No. 
Issues 
CNS/1998/092 
COM(1998)135 
Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down 
minimum standards for the protection of laying hens 
6 
CNS/1998/109 
COM(1998)158/3 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 of 17 May 1999 on 
the common organisation of the market in beef and veal 
2 
CNS/1998/110 
COM(1998)158/4 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 of 17 May 1999 on 
the common organisation of the market in milk and milk 
products 
2 
COD/1998/323 
COM(1998)623 
 
Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 22 May 2001 laying down rules for the 
prevention, control and eradication of certain transmissible 
spongiform encephalopathies 
3 
CNS/1999/072 
COM(1999)130 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1308/1999 of 15 June 1999 
amending Regulation (EC) No 2377/90 laying down a 
Community procedure for the establishment of maximum 
residue limits of veterinary medicinal products in foodstuffs 
of animal origin 
3 
CNS/1999/202 
COM(1999)188 
Council Directive 1999/105/EC of 22 December 1999 on the 
marketing of forest reproductive material 
3 
CNS/1999/202 
COM(1999)492 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1051/2001 of 22 May 2001 on 
production aid for cotton 
2 
COD/1999/204 
COM(1999)487 
Regulation (EC) No 1760/2000 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 17 July 2000 establishing a system for 
the identification and registration of bovine animals and 
regarding the labelling of beef and beef products and 
repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 820/97 
4 
COD/1999/217 
COM(1999)456 
Directive amending Directive 64/432/EEC: health problems 
affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and 
swine 
1 
CNS/1999/235 
COM(1999)582 
Council Regulation (EC) No 216/2001 of 29 January 2001 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 on the common 
organisation of the market in bananas 
 
2 
CNS/1999/236 
COM(1999)576 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1672/2000 of 27 July 2000 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1251/1999 establishing a 
support system for producers of certain arable crops, to 
2 
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include flax and hemp grown for fibre 
CNS/1999/246 
COM(1999)608 
 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1670/2000 of 20 July 2000 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 on the common 
organisation of the market in milk and milk products 
2 
CNS/2000/250 
COM(2000)604 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on 
the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector 
3 
CNS/2000/358 
COM(2000)855 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1513/2001 of 23 July 2001 
amending Regulations No 136/66/EEC and (EC) No 
1638/98 as regards the extension of the period of validity of 
the aid scheme and the quality strategy for olive oil 
5 
 
Internal Market (13 Commission proposals, 34 issues) 
Reference Name No. 
issues 
COD/1995/341 
COM(1995)655 
Proposal for a 13
th
 European Parliament and Council 
Directive on company law concerning takeover bids  
3* 
COD/1996/085 
COM(1996)097 
Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 September 2001 on the resale right for the 
benefit of the author of an original work of art 
4 
COD/1996/112 
COM(1995)722/1 
Directive 2000/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 June 2000 relating to cocoa and chocolate 
products intended for human consumption 
4 
CNS/1996/114 
COM(1995)722/3 
Council Directive 2001/110/EC of 20 December 2001 
relating to honey 
3 
CNS/1996/115 
COM(1995)722/4 
Council Directive 2001/112/EC of 20 December 2001 
relating to fruit juices and certain similar products intended 
for human consumption 
2 
COD/1996/161 
COM(1995)520 
Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of 
consumer goods and associated guarantees 
2 
COD/1997/264 
COM(1997)510 
Directive 2000/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 May 2000 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability 
in respect of the use of motor vehicles and amending 
Council Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (Fourth 
motor insurance Directive) 
1 
COD/1997/359 
COM(1997)628 
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society 
3 
COD/1998/134 
COM(1998)226 
Regulation (EC) No 2700/2000 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 November 2000 amending Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community 
Customs Code 
4 
COD/1998/191 
COM(1998)297 
Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework 
for electronic signatures 
3 
COD/1998/240 
COM(1998)450 
Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on orphan 
medicinal products 
1 
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COD/1998/325 
COM(1998)586 
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market ("Directive on electronic 
commerce") 
3 
COD/1999/158 
COM(1999)329 
Directive 2001/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 February 2001 amending Directive 95/2/EC 
on food additives other than colours and sweeteners 
1 
 
* This proposal was rejected by the European Parliament. The decision outcomes on these 
three issues therefore correspond with the reference point. There was also a fourth issue 
described by the experts. It was, however, not possible to define a reference point on this 
fourth issue due to the presence of fundamentally different legislative regimes in the different 
member states. Therefore, this issue cannot be included in the testing of the accuracy of the 
models‟ forecasts. 
 
Fisheries (7 Commission proposals, 13 issues) 
Reference Name No. 
issues 
CNS/1996/160 
COM(1996)296 
Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 of 30 March 1998 for 
the conservation of fishery resources through technical 
measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms 
1 
CNS/1998/347 
COM(1998)728 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 of 17 December 
1999 laying down the detailed rules and arrangements 
regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries 
sector 
2 
CNS/1999/047 
COM(1999)055 
Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 of 17 December 1999 
on the common organisation of the markets in fishery and 
aquaculture products 
3 
CNS/1999/050 
COM(1999)070 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1447/1999 of 24 June 1999 
establishing a list of types of behaviour which seriously 
infringe the rules of the common fisheries policy 
1 
CNS/1999/138 
COM(1999)345 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2791/1999 of 16 December 
1999 laying down certain control measures applicable in the 
area covered by the Convention on future multilateral 
cooperation in the north-east Atlantic fisheries 
2 
CNS/1999/163 
COM(1999)382 
Council Regulation (EC) No 657/2000 of 27 March 2000 on 
closer dialogue with the fishing sector and groups affected 
by the common fisheries policy 
2 
CNS/1999/255 
COM(1999)636 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1298/2000 of 8 June 2000 
amending for the fifth time Regulation (EC) No 850/98 for 
the conservation of fishery resources through technical 
measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms 
2 
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4) 
Table 4A: The proposals that are missing from the Council Minutes 1999-2002 (2003) 
sorted by year 
 
1998 (1 proposal) 
 
Fish 
CNS/1996/160 
COM(1996)296 
Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 of 30 March 1998 for 
the conservation of fishery resources through technical 
measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms 
 
1999 (3 proosals) 
 
Agri 
CNS/1999/202 
COM(1999)188 
Council Directive 1999/105/EC of 22 December 1999 on the 
marketing of forest reproductive material 
Int 
COD/1998/191 
COM(1998)297 
Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework 
for electronic signatures 
  
GA 
CNS/1999/132 
COM(1999)312 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2454/1999 of 15 November 
1999 amending Regulation (EC) No 1628/96 relating to aid 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, in particular by the setting up of a European 
Agency for Reconstruction 
 
 
 
2000 (10 proosals) 
Agri¨ 
CNS/1999/236 
COM(1999)576 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1672/2000 of 27 July 2000 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1251/1999 establishing a 
support system for producers of certain arable crops, to 
include flax and hemp grown for fibre 
Int 
COD/1998/134 
COM(1998)226 
Regulation (EC) No 2700/2000 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 November 2000 amending Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community 
Customs Code 
Int 
COD/1998/325 
COM(1998)586 
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market ("Directive on electronic 
commerce") 
Int  
COD/1998/240 
COM(1998)450 
Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on orphan 
medicinal products 
GA 
CNS/1998/299 
COM(1998)600/1 
Council Regulation (EC) No 764/2000 of 10 April 2000 
regarding the implementation of measures to intensify the 
EC-Turkey customs union 
GA Council Regulation (EC) No 2698/2000 of 27 November 
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CNS/1999/214 
COM(1999)494 
2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 on financial 
and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of 
economic and social structures in the framework of the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
Energy 
COD/1999/127 
COM(1999)296 
Directive 2000/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 18 September 2000 on energy efficiency 
requirements for ballasts for fluorescent lighting 
Soc 
COD/1998/195 
COM(1998)329 
Decision No 253/2000/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 January 2000 establishing the second 
phase of the Community action programme in the field of 
education Socrates 
Trans 
COD/1999/083 
COM(1999)158 
Directive 2000/61/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 10 October 2000 amending Council Directive 
94/55/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States with regard to the transport of dangerous goods by 
road 
JHA 
CNS/1999/116 
COM(1999)260 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 of 11 December 
2000 concerning the establishment of "Eurodac" for the 
comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of 
the Dublin Convention 
 
 
2001 (7 proposals) 
Agri 
COD/1998/323 
COM(1998)623 
 
Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 22 May 2001 laying down rules for the 
prevention, control and eradication of certain transmissible 
spongiform encephalopathies 
  
Int 
COD/1996/085 
COM(1996)097 
Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 September 2001 on the resale right for the 
benefit of the author of an original work of art 
JHA 
CNS/1999/154 
COM(1999)348 
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters 
GA 
COD/1998/300 
COM(1998)600/2 
Regulation (EC) No 257/2001 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 22 January 2001 regarding the 
implementation of measures to promote economic and social 
development in Turkey 
Cult 
COD/1999/275 
COM(1999)658/1 
Decision No 163/2001/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 19 January 2001 on the implementation of 
a training programme for professionals in the European 
audiovisual programme industry (MEDIA-Training) (2001-
2005) 
Dev 
COD/2000/062 
COM(2000)111/1 
Regulation (EC) No 1724/2001 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against 
anti-personnel landmines in developing countries 
Trans 
COD/1999/252 
Directive 2001/16/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 19 March 2001 on the interoperability of the 
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COM(1999)617 trans-European conventional rail system 
 
2002 (2 proposals) 
Trans 
COD/2000/060 
COM(2000)137 
Directive 2002/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 18 February 2002 amending Council Directive 
96/53/EC laying down for certain road vehicles circulating 
within the Community the maximum authorised dimensions 
in national and international traffic and the maximum 
authorised weights in international traffic 
Trans 
COD/2000/067 
COM(2000)142 
Regulation (EC) No 417/2002 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 18 February 2002 on the accelerated 
phasing-in of double hull or equivalent design requirements 
for single hull oil tankers and repealing Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2978/94 
 
 
Time not specified: (3 proposals) 
 
CNS/1998/288 
COM(1998)546 
Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) amending  
Regulation nr 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 
and 86 of the Treaty 
Int 
COD/1995/341 
COM(1995)655 
Proposal for a 13th European Parliament and Council 
Directive on company law concerning takeover bids 
 Internal Market 
COD/1999/238 
COM(1999)577 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the 
Council amending for the 22nd time Directive 76/769/EEC 
on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States relating to 
restrictions on the marketing and use of certain dangerous 
substances and preparations (phthalates) and amending 
Council Directive 88/378/EEC on the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States concerning the safety of toys  
 
26 proposals in total, 12 of them were on the agenda already prior to 1999. 
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Appendix B: Testing the Simple Spatial Model 
 
Table B: Positions and Votes –both Data Sets in one Table 
(position=mean value of issue-positions on proposals) 
 
Prop Ger Fr UK It Sp Nl Gr Bel Por Sw Au Dk Fi Ir Lu SQ X IP 
1 40 65 50 65 60 40 60 40 60 50 40 50 65 60 40 0 50 25 
2 0 0 100 100 35 35 35 0 0 100 0 100 0 30 0 0 43 21,5 
3 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 25 50 37,5 
4 35 20 85 20 20 23 25 25 25 35 83 83 35 20 48 0 35 17,5 
5 67 46 53 68 47 48 48 17 43 70 36 62 27 55 36 3 70 36,5 
6 20 20 20 0 20 20 0 20 20 20 50 20 20 20 50 0 30 15 
7 20 60 45 3 60 30 0 20 60 15 25 35 20 65 25 0 60 30 
8 50 18 18 55 38 18 75 75 38 50 75 50 75 38 75 43 75 59 
9 40 100 40 60 60 80 60 100 60 60 60 60 60 40 60 0 40 20 
10 75 75 0 100 100 100 25 75 100 50 75 0 50 0 100 0 50 25 
11 75 63 9 100 95 32 83 90 90 9 68 63 24 37 14 0 47 23,5 
12 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 0 0 50 25 
13 10 100 20 50 10 100 10 100 60 80 60 10 80 80 100 0 60 30 
14 25 90 0 70 70 0 70 70 70 25 25 25 25 70 70 70 50 60 
15 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 50 0 100 50 
16 0 33 33 67 67 33 67 67 67 33 67 33 67 67 67 NA 40  
17 0 0 17 0 17 17 0 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA 18  
18 92 13 80 67 13 67 47 92 13 80 67 63 80 47 80 0 53 26,5 
19 0 50 50 85 50 65 85 50 85 50 50 35 50 60 50 0 35 17,5 
20 75 85 75 75 75 40 73 60 73 25 85 40 40 25 73 25 63 44 
21 0 100 0 80 80 0 80 100 80 40 40 40 40 80 80 80 80 80 
22 53 62 74 73 59 36 38 36 32 47 37 43 37 43 68 NA 56  
23 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
24 82 81 82 79 80 81 65 85 80 82 50 82 80 80 86 0 79 39,5 
25 40 100 40 60 60 80 60 100 60 60 60 60 60 40 60 0 40 20 
26 45 90 78 58 60 43 23 70 43 62 25 52 62 90 18 0 79 39,5 
27 55 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 0 53 26,5 
28 13 87 0 87 87 40 87 70 83 7 33 7 7 54 42 0 47 23,5 
29 0 100 0 100 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 35 
30 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 0 78 39 
31 42 83 33 83 83 42 42 83 42 42 42 42 42 33 42 0 46 23 
32 100 0 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 0 100 50 
33 45 17 51 17 17 61 17 17 17 51 45 51 45 17 45 NA 49  
34 10 10 20 10 50 50 50 20 0 50 20 50 20 10 20 0 40 20 
35 91 95 61 41 52 48 56 61 66 61 68 61 91 43 66 0 61 30,5 
36 100 100 50 100 100 100 50 100 50 100 0 100 100 100 100 0 100 50 
37 50 50 38 20 50 50 20 50 50 50 50 50 50 38 50 50 70 60 
38 50 50 0 0 50 0 0 25 50 100 25 84 100 50 0 50 59 54,5 
39 67 100 67 100 100 67 100 100 100 67 100 67 100 100 100 0 17 8,5 
40 10 53 10 67 67 10 67 10 67 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 21 10,5 
41 22 22 22 22 89 22 89 22 89 22 22 22 22 22 22 33 63 48 
42 0 100 100 0 100 100 0 50 0 100 50 100 100 100 100 0 NA  
43 73 73 50 73 73 85 73 66 73 85 73 85 73 73 12 0 NA  
44 0 30 40 27 10 30 17 27 50 27 0 27 30 30 17 NA NA  
 
Explanations: 
Bold=negative positions in the DEU data 
Red=negative statements in the voting data 
Red bold=negative overlap 
SQ=status quo 
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X=decision outcome 
IP=Indifferent point 
 
 
Figure 1B: Visual Illustration of Both Data Sets 
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Appendix C: R-codes21 
 
####################### 
# Replication R-code  # 
# Council:Position and# 
# voting data:PC,CA,  # 
# MDS and HC analyses # 
####################### 
rm(list=ls())  
library(car) 
setwd('Steinmetz/datasets')  
library(foreign)  
Data <- read.spss('format2slettetm.sav',  
 use.value.labels=TRUE, max.value.labels=Inf, to.data.frame=TRUE)  
dim(Data) 
summary(Data)  
attach(Data)  
Countries <- data.frame(PAUS,PBEL,PDK,PFIN,PFRANCE,PGER, 
 PGRCE,PIRE,PITY,PLUX,PNL,PPORT,PSPAIN,PSWED,PUK) 
detach(Data)  
names(Countries) <-c('Austria','Belgium','Denmark','Finland','France', 
'Germany','Greece','Ireland','Italy','Luxembourg','Netherlands','Portugal',
'Spain','Sweden','UK')  
summary(Countries) 
 
#Principal component (PC) 
pr.council <- prcomp(Countries) 
summary(pr.council)# Loadings 
probs <- round((pr.council$sdev^2/sum(pr.council$sdev^2)),3) 
barplot(probs, col=as.numeric(probs > .075), 
 xlab ="principal components", 
 ylab = "proportion of variance explained", 
 main = "Dimensionality of conflict in the Council")  
abline(h=.075)  
pos.countries <- data.frame(pr.council$rotation[,1:2] ) 
attach(pos.countries) 
plot(PC1,PC2, 
main="Council in the Council", 
ylab="2nd dimension", 
xlab="1st dimension",  
pch=16  
) 
identify(PC1,PC2,row.names(pos.countries))  
detach(pos.countries) 
 
# Hierarchical clustering (HC) 
hc.council <- hclust(dist(t(Countries))) 
summary(hc.council) 
plot(hc.council,main="Coalitions in the Council") 
 
#Correspondence analysis (CA) 
library(languageR)  
#bruk install.packages("languageR") 
dist.council <- as.matrix(dist(t(Countries)))  
co.council <- corres.fnc(dist.council)  
summary(co.council,returnList=TRUE,head=FALSE)  
plot(co.council,addcol=FALSE,main="Coalitions in the Council  
Correspondence analysis")  
 
# Multidimensional scaling (MDS) 
ms.council <- cmdscale(dist.council,k=2)  
cor.test(ms.council[,1],ms.council[,2],method="sp")  
plot(ms.council[,1],ms.council[,2], main="Coalition in the Council 
                                                     
21
 Thanks to Bjørn Høyland for valuable help regarding these R-codes. 
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multidimensional scaling",xlab="Factor 1",ylab="Factor 2") 
identify(ms.council[,1],ms.council[,2],row.names(ms.council)) 
 
# The correspondence analysis code is applied to the datasets 
#"AllVotesGovernments1999-2002.csv","Thomson.csv”(44 positions) and 
#CouncilVotes.csv" (44 votes) as well. 
